Changing Regime Discourse and Reform in Syria by Sottimano, Aurora & Selvik, Kjetil
 
 
St Andrews Papers on Modern Syrian Studies 
Issue No 1, Autumn 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Changing Regime 
Discourse 
and Reform in Syria 
 
 
Aurora Sottimano and Selvik Kjetil 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Published by the Centre for Syrian Studies, University of St. Andrews, Fife, 
Scotland; Distributed by Lynne Rienner Press, Boulder, CO, USA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN: 978-0-9559687-1-6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents: 
 
1. Introduction: Changing Discourse under the Ba’th 
Raymond Hinnebusch                                                                                                    4 
 
2. Ideology And Discourse in the Era of Ba’thist Reforms:       5 
Towards an Analysis of Authoritarian Governmentality 
Aurora Sottimano 
 
3. It’s the Mentality, Stupid: Syria’s Turn to the Private Sector    33 
Kjetil Selvik 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
Introduction: Changing Discourse under the Ba’th 
By Raymond Hinnebusch 
 
Ideology and discourse enable us to chart, on one crucial level, the evolution of 
Syria’s political economy. Through it we are enabled to see the way material changes 
and constraints of the political economy, whether the outcomes of failed projects or 
new policies, are understood, promoted, and legitimatized. 
 
Aurora Sottimano shows that ideology matters and is an autonomous variable, 
especially in periods of change. In the Syrian Ba’th case, actors were ideologically 
driven at a certain point but in the consolidation of regimes, ideology becomes 
principally a hegemonic discourse meant to discipline social forces. Yet, it also 
constrains what can subsequently be advocated as legitimate; hence it tends to retard 
adaptation to material constraints in a sort of path dependency; still, when the gap 
between ideology and reality widens too much, ideology is modified, even reinvented 
to take account of constraints.  
 
Sottomano charts how the original Ba’thist discourse identified the obstacles to 
Syria’s development as backward traditional mentalities imperialism and feudal 
classes, and with the Ba’thist leaders seeing themselves as a vanguard mobilize 
workers and peasants to push development ahead. Hafiz al-Asad, although a 
pragmatist, could not abandon this discourse but used it as a disciplinary mechanism 
to create corporatist control of workers and peasants. Later, regime discourse stressed 
the need for production, austerity, and sacrifice to reach parity with Israel, and social 
peace within which de-mobilized workers ability to demands higher wages. Asad’s 
discourse simultaneously talked of private-public partnership and distinguished a 
category of acceptable good capitalists as a way of co-opting the bourgeoisie; yet 
because of ideological constraint, the bourgeoisie could not be fully or formally 
incorporated into the regime and had to be co-opted thru clientalist networks which 
encouraged rent-seeking rather than productive investment. The failures of Ba’thist 
statism had been evident since the late eighties, but it was only in the nineties that 
debate within the Syrian Economic Association started promoting a new discourse 
that legitimized a return to the market. 
 
Kjetil Selvik analyses the subsequent change in discourse accompanying Bashar al-
Asad’s economic liberalization after 2000. The old populist social contract is to be 
replaced with a new one that allows the bourgeoisie access and activism while the 
workers and peasants are being de-mobilized; the state no longer claims to represent 
them but they are not to be allowed greater freedom to strike, lobby etc. The discourse 
of the new liberalizing Five Year Plan talks about changes in mentality needed for 
development, targeting the regimes old constituencies of civil servants and workers as 
the problem. On the other hand entrepreneurship is to be fostered. These changes 
opened the door for the emerging bourgeoisie to promote a similar discourse: the 
main obstacle to development is bureaucrats who, being poor students, were trained in 
the East bloc and just want an easy job. Or it is laziness of workers. Some 
businessmen advocate a social Darwinism in which the entrepreneurs benefit from the 
transition to the new market economy while the rest have to pay its price. The new 
disciplining is aimed mostly at labour and on behalf of capital. 
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Ideology And Discourse in the Era of Ba’thist Reforms: 
Towards an Analysis of Authoritarian Governmentality 
 
Aurora Sottimano 
 
This paper aims at developing an analysis of the political economy of Ba'thist 
Syria from a discursive analytical perspective. Using the insights of Michel Foucault 
on discourse, power and government, the aim of this paper is to investigate the role of 
economic discourse in the maintenance and transformation of power relations in Syria. 
This approach suggests that economic discourse has been instrumental not only in 
restructuring the Syrian economy over time, but also in reshaping the social imaginary 
whilst re-constructing Syrian society. By looking at the formation, the functioning and 
the trajectory of Syrian economic discourse, one of the aims of this paper is to 
demonstrate how discourse analysis can contribute to the sharpening of our analytical 
gaze. At another level, the paper concerns itself with broadening our analytical 
understanding of modern strategies of government. The ongoing problematisation of 
the economy (through such moves as correction, reform, opening, transition) has 
accompanied a refinement of the art of government which involves a rethinking of the 
modalities and points of application of power. This analysis is a pre-requisite for 
theoretical reflections on authoritarian articulations of power and their transformation, 
with a view towards locating them – with the help of Foucault’s concepts of discipline 
and governmentality - on the trajectory of the governmentalisation of the modern state. 
 
My adoption of a discursive method of analysis for political and economic realities 
requires some explanation. The notion of discourse has come to mean different things 
in different places. A variety of discourse analysis programmes composed from 
fragments of different theories, offer a choice of analytical strategies.1 More than 
anyone else, Michel Foucault in his groundbreaking studies has developed an agenda 
for discourse analysis, which has pioneered the use of such analysis in the service of 
social science in general and political analysis in particular. Nevertheless, he did not 
consciously seek to form a school or a theory. Instead, he invited scholars to ‘use’ his 
insights as a box of ‘tools’ for analysis.2 This is my excuse for using Foucault rather 
eclectically whilst taking the liberty of bringing into my argumentation elements from 
other discourse theories. 
 
The narrative of this paper follows a chronological order for reasons other than to 
give a comprehensive history of Syrian economic policies or Ba’thist ideology. My 
focus is on elements of economic discourse, their formation, transformation and 
mutual conditioning against a broader background in which other discourses and 
                                                
1 See Andersen, Discursive Analytical Strategies, 2003, on the analytical approaches of Foucault, 
Laclau, Koselleck and Luhman. For an intellectual history of the concept of discourse, see 
Sawyer, A Discourse on Discourse: an archaeological history of an intellectual concept, in 
Cultural Studies, vol. 16, 3, p. 433-456. 
2  See  Foucault, Power/Knowledge. Selected  Interviews and Other Writings, 1980, p. 145 
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practices play a role. Therefore an historical perspective is essential in order to 
appreciate the transformations that themes and issues undergo during the process of 
production and reproduction of the discourse.  As with any political and economic 
history, this study is concerned with continuities and change. Yet unlike mainstream 
historical accounts, this perspective focuses on continuities and changes within 
discourse, such as the emergence of signifiers, concepts and discursive strategies, and 
their way of functioning. 
 
 
On discourse analysis and analytical strategies 
The work of Michel Foucault has enlarged and enriched the study of discourse 
beyond the limitations posed to this problématique by standard historians of thought, 
concerned with fixed sets of ideas; and mainstream Marxist analysts intent on 
exposing ideological manipulation and exploitation.3 For Foucault, every utterance is 
always already located within a specific discourse, to which certain rules apply. The 
notion of discourse points to a web of norms, presuppositions, definitions and shared 
segments of meaning: Through the play of implicit prescriptions, discourses 
‘systematically form the object of which they speak’; construct priorities and 
hierarchies; classify and differentiate social experience; and create systems of 
exclusion which establish certain concepts and construct them as a ‘truth’.4 Whilst 
determining the limit of what can be said and thought in a normal or acceptable way - 
thereby directly or implicitly discrediting other choices - discourses establish ‘regimes 
of truth’ that regulate our way of approaching the world, each other, and ourselves. In 
this view, ‘truth’ is historically traceable, contingent, and a product of struggle.5 
The discursive strategies that produce true discourse – including procedures of 
exclusion, and norms of acceptability - are the objects of Foucault’s analysis. These 
strategies also produce legitimate subjects of discourse: the subject is part of the 
discursive field and operates in a discursive context of regulated practices, in which 
dominant discourses supply social actors with ‘subject positions’ and ‘legitimate 
perspectives’.6 Therefore, in this view, the boundaries of what is acceptable and 
politically correct; what counts as truth; and who becomes either an enemy or a 
legitimate subject of rights are all carved out from a discursive context. 
 
The next step in Foucault’s analytical strategy is to show how discourse cannot exist in 
isolation from power. Both as power/knowledge complexes and as means of 
communication, discourses describe a reality in order to materialise it, whilst 
informing practices and social norms, which themselves cannot exist outside discourse.  
As a web of strategies of purposeful activity, and vehicles for the reproduction of such 
strategies at the same time, discourses are themselves mechanisms of power.7 Despite 
the apparent solidity of hegemonic power/truth configurations, this power structure is 
inherently unstable and contestable, and people are never totally inscribed within 
                                                
3 See Foucault, Truth and Power’ interview, in Michel Foucault, Power, Truth, Strategy, 1979, p. 
36 
4 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 1972, p. 49 
5 On ‘regimes of truth’ See Rabinow (ed), The Foucault Reader, 1984, p. 74. On the politics of 
truth see Rajchman,  Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy, 1985, p.119 
6 The concept of discourse does not presuppose a human subject on the lines of the model 
provided by classical philosophy. See Foucault, ‘Body Power’ interview, in Power/Knowledge, 
cit.; and Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 1977, p. 199.  
7 See Foucault, Power /Knowledge, cit.; Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 1991. 
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relations of domination.8 The conventions that constitute the social order have to be 
constantly reproduced and reconfirmed in actual communication situations. 
Consequently, the power structure of a society can and should be studied directly 
through discourse. 
A Foucaultian discourse analysis provides the political analyst with tools to depict the 
norms, boundaries, and strategies that infuse social and political practices, and to 
investigate the production and reproduction of the power structure. The discourse 
analytic task is to enquire about the categories that we use; to ask about the narrative 
remaining neutral regarding the truth or value-claims inbuilt in it; to be attentive to 
the terms in which discursive struggles over truth, norms and issues have been carried 
out. The Foucaultian gaze is also inherently critical:  it alerts us to the possibilities of 
thinking and acting differently. 
 
To conclude, this paper aims at developing an analysis of the economic discourse that 
shaped the Ba'thist project to redesign the economic, social, and political landscape of 
Syria between the 1960s and the turn of the millennium.  Drawing on Foucault’s 
insights on discourse, knowledge and power, I use discourse here to mean a 
historically specific body of concepts, norms, and strategies that play a crucial role in 
diffusing a set of organised and organising social practices through which meaning is 
given to physical and social realities. Economic discourse is the point where an 
established or ‘true’ knowledge about the economy and the exercise of power meet and 
reinforce each other. What constitutes the economy, and which targets and methods of 
economic activity one might consider appropriate in any given circumstances are all 
discursively constructed. Moreover, economic discourse describes actions and roles for 
economic actors to undertake; actions requiring their participation in practices that 
define the boundaries of which perceptions are appropriate; which expectations are to 
be fulfilled; and ultimately who the actors are. An analysis of Ba'thist economic 
discourse will show: a) that the institution of a modern economy is at the heart of the 
process of reshaping the social imaginary and constituting a modern society; and b) 
that economic discourse functions as a technology of government. 
 
A Portrait of Ba'thist Syria 
 
Syria is a late-developing country in which the question of progress, with its 
arsenal of western categories, was first raised during late Ottoman times, and later 
became instrumental in forming a new ‘modern’ nation-state. France, the power given 
the mandate by the League of Nations to improve the country in the name of western 
civilisation, introduced some degree of modernisation mainly in infrastructure and 
agriculture.  This effort to modernise Syria was limited by their recognition that ‘a 
veritable social revolution’ was a necessary prerequisite for true development and that 
only a nationalist government could have both interest and legitimacy to embark on 
it.9 Since independence, Syria has become a veritable ‘arena of experiment’ in 
political and economic innovation, including liberalism, socialism, military rule, 
                                                
8 The sort of ‘deterministic’ tone suggested by expressions like structure, logic, and rationality, 
together with the propensity of scholars to systematise Foucault’s theorization of discourse, is 
nowhere linked to the epistemology of his approach.  
9 Whitaker, The Union of Demetra with Zeus: Agriculture and Politics in modern Syria, 
dissertation, 1996, p.356 
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autarchy, étatisme`, openness (infitah), and capitalism.10 The imperative to reinforce 
political independence by policies of economic and social development dominated the 
emergence of a national political economy. While rejecting western occupation and 
interference, the Syrian political elite, liberal and socialists alike, adopted the arsenal 
of Western development categories articulated by the same powers, which they had 
fought as colonialists. The notions of progress as a linear path from tradition to 
modernity; of the natural right of peoples to progress; of a central role played by the 
state in pushing history forward - all were central to the efforts made by Syrian 
regimes to build hegemony out of independence. The starting points were the will to 
change; the vision of development as progress bolstered by the faith in the necessity 
and desirability of reaching it; and finally the perception of the economy as a field of 
rational intervention where application of appropriate knowledge would bring about 
prosperity. Syrian modernizers of all credos were united by the necessity to break 
‘social barriers’ to progress – that is to dissolve pre-modern economies and all their 
cultural buttresses - coupled with a reluctance to take the risk of doing so. The new 
nation’s self imposed mission to assert the natural right of peoples to progress, in 
order to catch up with the developed West, quickly pushed Syrian modernizers to 
collide with an older national leadership contented by mere political independence. 
This imperative to develop was coupled with a strongly confrontational stand that had 
been shaped by the struggles for independence, and reinforced by the threats imposed 
by the Cold War and the occupation of Palestine. 
 
Having seized power with the 1963 revolution (thawra), Ba'th leaders still faced the 
unresolved problems of creating a stable political order and a functional national 
economy. These revolutionaries resolutely launched the country on the way to 
progress armed with the legitimacy gained during anti- ‘feudal’ struggles; the 
authority of a nationalist government entitled to speak for the nation; the experience 
of statist techniques of economic management and bureaucratic organization inherited 
from the French; and the institutional legacy and the model of corporatist 
development of the union with Nasser’s Egypt. The Ba'thist takeover in 1963 marked 
the birth of a populist authoritarian regime that pursued a self-declared socialist 
strategy of economic development largely based on étatisme and autarchy.11 The 
Ba'thist road to modernisation was characterised by strong nationalism; the perception 
of the state as the prime mover of economic activity; economic programmes based on 
nationalisations, land reform, subsidies, price control, import substitution and 
protection of local industry; the allocation of government resources to reward 
followers and punish opponents; peasant and urban underclass mobilisation against 
the oligarchy; growth of trade union militancy shadowed by government control of 
organised labour and its use as a reserve army  for mass demonstration in support of 
the party; and a professed aim of restoring stability to the country and some dignity to 
politics, previously in the hands of politicians who did not represent the aspirations of 
society.12 Such a society, in the name of which Ba'thist leaders were governing, did 
not exist yet. Between the sacralised notion of ‘the Arab nation’, and the 
fragmentation and backwardness of the Syrian populace, the Ba’thists envisaged a 
new Syrian Arab society: it was a society which had still to be forged in terms of 
identity, community of vision, will and interests. This would be one of the main tasks 
                                                
10 Al-Samman, Al-Iqtisad al-Suri wa-l-Rasmaliyya al-Jadida, 1997, p.1 
11 this section is based on Sottimano, The politics of economic reform in Asad’s Syria, in Journal 
of Mediterranean Studies,  vol.14 no. 1&2, 2004, p 134-138 
12 This is a definition of populism by Benjamin Arditi, which is well tailored to Ba'thist Syria 
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of economic discourse. The Ba'th leadership took upon themselves to decide not only 
what policies were more appropriate to reach prosperity, but also which issues, 
values, forces and practices, would be placed under the heading of ‘the national 
economy’. 
 
The Ba'th appeared as a force of modernisation opposed to a class enemy composed 
of feudalists, bourgeoisie and bureaucratic groups ‘incapable of protecting the wealth 
of the country’.13 These were held responsible for Syria‘s backwardness and 
dependence on international capitalism: therefore a socialist strategy based on 
étatisme and autarchy was deemed necessary. At the level of discourse, the economy 
was constructed as a terrain of conflict: a struggle between a scientific ‘true’ 
knowledge and pre-existing attitudes; between new state institutions and old 
structures; between progressive and reactionary forces. The Ba’thists embraced 
Western scientific knowledge, nationalist passion, socialist planning, and class 
struggle together with the paternalistic model of development embodied by the 
mandate’s mission. In this view, ‘backward’ people needed an extended period of 
education in order to be able to adopt the appropriate rationality that would enable 
them to progress, starting with perceiving themselves as living in a pre-historical 
stage from which they could and would emancipate. Development became a right of 
the people, more specifically a right of workers, peasants and progressive forces of 
the nation. As depositories of a true knowledge, a ‘correct’ morality as well as 
awareness of laws of historical necessity, Ba’th revolutionaries developed for 
themselves the image of whose who lead the masses and ‘rescue’ them from the 
medieval mentality which impede their advance’.14 Not just to respond to people’s 
demands, but actually to articulate and interpret them: this was the mission of the 
Ba'thist ‘vanguard’, which would exert ‘continuous ideological effort among the 
masses’ in order to spread ‘the appropriate socialist morality’.15 
 
The transformation of the ordinary Syrian citizen into an agent of progress could 
neither be enforced nor imposed by law or sovereign fiat; more effective techniques 
were necessary. Many of these were made available by the institutions of the modern 
state: the school, the army, the party, and the media were instrumental in re-
organising public space and time. The many new venues of public life - including the 
square for rallies and state celebrations; the school for patriotic education; unions and 
cooperatives to train and organise workers and peasants; the discipline of military 
service and popular organisations – all acted as disciplining bodies involving people 
in public activities, disseminating a common language, and ultimately creating a new 
sociability and a sense of ‘nationhood’. The availability of such modern state 
institutions and the ability on part of the Ba'th of make use of them as sites for 
disciplining people, made this massive project of social engineering possible. Above 
all, it was the institution of a new discursive economy of truth in relation to 
development that opened up this unprecedented space for political intervention, i.e. 
the promotion of appropriate values and conducts conducive to development. 
Individuals, groups, and classes were allocated in discursively defined categories of 
actors (worker, peasant, progressive forces, productive masses etc), which required 
                                                
13 Arab Socialist Ba’th Party, Some Theoretical Principles, 1974 (henceforth Muntalaqat),  p. 56 
14 Muntalaqat, cit.,  p.23 
15 Arab Socialist Ba’th Party, Party Program, 1965, p. 27-28 
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from them new kind of participation and new sensibilities, in a new frame of meaning 
that was also discursively constructed. 
 
It was principally to workers and peasants that this project was addressed: they were 
the main actors in the expected economic transformation of the country, and the 
pillars of the new Ba'th regime. The close regulation of industrial workers in unions 
supervised by party representatives ensured their disciplined participation in the 
Ba'thist development project, and their incorporation in the Ba'thist state. Workers 
were urged to recognise the fact that ‘they are not in a battle against the authorities 
anymore’.16 Therefore the role of the union, which previously had been one of 
defending workers’ rights whilst ameliorating their material conditions, became to 
embody the Ba'thist slogan of ‘unity, freedom and socialism’ under the  ‘guidance and 
enlightenment’ of the party. 
 
After 1963, the agricultural sector of the economy also became enmeshed with a 
network of institutional arrangements explicitly intended to re-orient peasant attitudes 
and reorganise their relations with the state. Regimented in cooperatives and 
collectives, peasants would acquire material benefits for themselves; become a 
‘productive force [… and] increase the wealth of the country’ whilst undergoing the 
necessary training to develop an ‘awareness’ of their interest and their role in such a 
project.17 Their participation in the agricultural revolution was considered 
indispensable in order to ‘throw the masses in the heart of the struggle for socialism 
and liberation’ and ultimately for ‘the creation of a new man and a new society’.18 
Following the February 1966 coup, a full-blown state corporatist apparatus was 
developed. This encompassed existing professional associations as well as a large 
number of newly formed popular organisations, including paramilitary groups. The 
centrality of economic discourse in the Ba’thist project to install a new order in Syria 
can hardly be overestimated. People were ‘inculcated’ a political lexicon based on a 
virtually incontestable moral universe of shared meanings: social justice, rights, 
equality, freedom, national pride, progress, and welfare. In this new economy of 
discourse, economic actors acquired new roles to perform, and a new self-image, 
which smoothed the transformation of revolutionary leaders into legitimate rulers, and 
of the people into ‘productive’ workers and disciplined citizens. 
 
By taking charge of the economy, the Ba'thist state would acquire a specific identity 
as well: that of the only possible agent of a development saturating the whole national 
territory, as well as the only possible guarantor of the equity of such development. By 
placing the economy within the space – material as well as symbolic – of the nation-
state, the whole question of development became a central concern for sovereignty. 
Development, equated with economic liberation from external as well as internal 
exploitation, was discursively constructed as a right for the newly independent nation-
state, and was the natural outcome of socialism. By recognising themselves as a 
society with a common vision and will, the working classes would acquire the right 
and the ability to attain development, and indeed ‘give birth to the nation’.19 
 
                                                
16 Party Program, cit, p. 33 
17 Bitar, Cabinet statement, Damascus, May 23, in Arab Political Documents, 1964, p.168. 
18 Le Syndacalisme Paysan en RAS, 1970,  p. 4; and Party Program 1965, cit., p. 28 
19 Muntalaqat, cit.,  p.18 
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Well beyond its function of remodelling the economic sector, Ba'thist economic 
discourse constituted a colossal repository of emotional, moral, ideological and 
symbolic potentialities from which Ba'thist policy makers could draw tools and tactics 
for the exercise of power. The allocation of individuals and groups in discursively 
defined categories of actors (the worker, the peasant, the bourgeoisie, etc.), which 
required from these subjects new kinds of participation in a new frame of meaning, 
was already an act of government. The redefinition of concepts and tactics in terms of 
a purported scientific knowledge also formed an act of political intervention.  
Programmes and policies presented as the result of ‘sound scientific thinking’ and 
‘deep objective study of Arab circumstances’20 functioned as a mechanism for 
delimiting what could be said; for setting priorities; and for discrediting alternative 
views. Since only ‘scientific rational planning’ could guarantee development,21 
demands that did not correspond to the fixed priorities could be rejected in the name 
of this plan. The dissemination of economic discourse was therefore part of a practice 
that required tacit acceptance and eschewed political debate. 
 
A vehemently polemic style of narrative is another of the characteristics of Ba'thist 
economic discourse that needs to be seen as a power tactic. The economy was 
discursively constructed as a terrain of struggle between subjects who possess rights 
and principles and reactionary forces which are responsible for ‘the inherited 
backwardness of the country’.22 The fracture between revolution and counter-
revolution; progress and reaction appeared beyond redress:  political opponents were 
discursively constructed as an enemy to fight until total defeat. This style of narrative 
was more than a rhetorical expedient:  it validated real political practices that squarely 
put justice, right and innocence in one camp.23 
 
The discursive construction of Ba’thist ‘socialist morality’ fuelled a radical economic, 
social and political reconstruction that changed the profile of the country. This change 
included the redistribution of assets on a national scale; the marginalisation of the old 
land-owning and bourgeois classes; and the formation of a public sector that 
embodied and fostered the wealth of the nation. The creation of the ‘national 
economy’ also entailed a radical restructuring of the Syrian social imaginary, the 
nurturing of a specific agency  (both individual and collective) for the people to 
‘awaken’ and become capable, as a nation, of building their own prosperity. 
The Ba'thist political agenda was as well a repertoire of useful tools for governing. 
The nationalist rhetoric of ‘economy building’ provided the necessary legitimacy and 
vision for the Ba'thists to take the lead in the march towards progress. The discursive 
construction of the inferior, underdeveloped masses provided the rationale for a 
disciplinarisation of society deemed necessary to transform these masses into a proud 
people (‘worth of the nation’). The discursive construction of the economy as a terrain 
of struggle against enemies within and without set up a powerful frontier between the 
friend and the enemy; the desirable and the unthinkable; correct attitudes and immoral 
behaviour. Opposite camps holding mutually excluding identities with fixed or pre-
given choices and interests, associated with ‘correct’ behaviour, became characteristic 
of the discursive terrain on which identities were grounded and the Ba'thist project of 
                                                
20 Hafez, Interview, 10 August1963 in Arab Political Documents, p. 356.  Bitar, Cabinet 
Statement, cit., p.262. See also Muntalaqat, cit., p. 23-25 
21 Rapport  sur l’Economie Syrienne, OFA, 1963-64 
22 Muntalaqat, cit., p. 90 
23 Rabinow and Rose, The Essential Foucault, 2003, p. 18-24. 
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social engineering was based. Grasping this discursive construction as operative and 
enabling is crucial to understanding the ways in which Syrian economic discourse 
operated as a discourse of power. This division mapped the terrain of possible – that 
is, meaningful, legitimate or obligatory – political action in many ways.  Crucially, 
the purported qualities attributed to the ‘good’ citizen became part of a ‘correct’ 
behaviour. This helped to shape the identity of the Syrian citizen, including his 
expectations and demands, and the kind of sociability in which s/he was asked to 
identify. 
 
This discourse nurtured the sensibility and shaped the Weltanshauung of Ba'thists of 
the first generation. Once in power, their political discourse continued to be proudly 
nationalist, strongly confrontational (domestically and in their foreign policy), and 
revolutionary progressive with respect to Syrian social, economic and political 
structures. During the turbulent 1960s, when strong rivals – the old oligarchy, 
Nasserites, the Muslim Brotherhood and even Communists – challenged the Ba’thist 
claim to rule, economic discourse functioned both as an instrument of and a stake in 
confrontation. The Ba’thists competed with other forces of the leftist camp for the 
appropriation of a revolutionary discourse, to serve as a weapon with which to sweep 
away the old ‘reactionary’ leadership and to marginalize ‘pre-modern’ Islamists. 
Within the Ba’th, intra-elite ideological differences persisted over the pace and depth 
of ‘Arab socialism’ and the proper definition of the constellation of issues around it. 
Ultimately the lack of ideological rigour and clarity was no obstacle to devising a 
mobilisation strategy based on the strongly confrontational resources of Ba’thist 
discourse. Crucially, the mobilisation of workers, peasants and progressive forces 
functioned both as an instrument of regime support and a vehicle of political 
indoctrination. The goal was the ‘inculcation’ of the politically correct sensibility, one 
that would guarantee ‘correct’ behaviour on the part of citizens, and ultimately bring 
about the Ba'thist transformation of the country. This discursive context shaped the 
formation of Ba’thist Syria; it also shaped the room for manoeuvre of Syrian 
politicians, as the ‘rectification’ of Ba'thist policies will show. Asad’s correction of 
Ba’thist techniques of governing the economy started from these premises and 
operated largely within the horizon of Ba'thist revolutionary discourse. 
 
 
Asad’s “Corrective Movement” 
 
By 1970 the Ba’thist model of development was already under discussion. The 
seizure of power by General Hafiz al-Asad in November 1970 saw the official 
inauguration of the ‘rectification’ of Ba'thist policies, and introduced significant 
changes in the political economy of Syria, changes which entailed serious breaches of 
socialist economic principles.  Asad took power with the awareness that a strictly 
dirigiste economy meant condemning his country to economic stagnation, whilst 
radical socialist policies were not a winning strategy for the long term. He opened 
Syria to foreign capital and private initiative, promoted the mixed (public and private) 
sector, relaxed restrictions on foreign trade, legalised free zones, and forged alliances 
with conservative Arab states with no socialist credentials. On the home front, he 
presented these moves as the introduction of a new policy of ‘economic plurality’ and 
‘openness to the people’, which included the launch of the National Progressive 
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Front, and a new Constitution.24 Among the promises of the new regime, prominence 
was given to the establishment of economic liberalisation and popular democracy, 
both framed into a renewed ‘race to development’. Nevertheless Asad did not openly 
criticise the major accomplishment of Ba’thist socialism, nor did he discard the 
Ba'thist repertoire of ideological tools: the guiding principles of Syria economic 
policy, spelled out in 1973 after he had stabilised Syrian affairs at home and abroad, 
merely elaborated established guidelines and reaffirmed the centrality of socialism, 
the catalytic role of the public sector, and the importance of scientific planning.25 The 
Ba'thist triad ‘unity, freedom and socialism’ continued to occupy centre stage in 
political language. In keeping with established Ba'th wisdom, the list of principles 
allegedly informing public policies included: the national economy as the expression 
of autonomy and progress; socialism as the path to people’s welfare under the leading 
role of the public sector; the containment of capitalism and defence of the revolution 
against imperialism and capitalism, whilst developing a modern economy to recover 
national wealth and pride. All changes introduced were ideologically justified as a 
‘corrective movement’ (haraka tashihiya, as it has since been officially called), one 
that was directed to ‘rectify the methods by which the policy was being implemented’ 
and therefore correct rather than reverse what were seen as deviations from the party’s 
theoretical points of departure (Muntalaqat).26 The Regional Congress promptly 
endorsed President Asad’s actions and programme. 
 
The apparent contradiction between ‘the corrective movement’ and its professed 
continuity with Ba'thism has not attracted much attention. According to most scholars, 
socialism was maintained as a tenet in the rhetoric of the ruling party, whilst the political 
economy of Syria was turned into state capitalism;27 the continued parade of Ba’thist 
slogans served at best as a legitimating tool, due to the preoccupation with the popularity 
of the Ba'th among the Arab masses.28 As the credibility of Ba'thism became attenuated 
over time, discontent was deepening, and the confrontation between government and 
opposition assumed a ferocious and tragic dimension (suffice it to mention the savage 
repression of Islamist opposition in Hama), the explanatory force of the concept of 
legitimation in relation to the survival of Ba'thist ideology became at best questionable. 
Taken at face value, one could even argue that Ba'thist ideals actually backfired, as they 
came to be used against a leadership who appeared hardly to embody the image they 
projected through their own propaganda. 
 
The analysis of Ba'thist economic discourse might offer other explanations for the 
continued use of Ba'thist rhetoric - provided we abandon the derogatory and dismissive 
meaning of ‘rhetoric’ as a vehicle for the delivery of ‘false’ meaning, and analyse instead 
rhetorical and symbolic signifiers as part of discursive strategies. By recognizing the 
normative and strategic dimension of discourse, and placing Asad’s ‘corrective move’ 
against the discursive context of Ba'thist discourse, we can re-assess Asad’s corrective 
movement and substantiate the hypothesis that the 8th March revolution shifted the 
development trajectory of the country in ways that have since continued to affect how its 
leaders responded to contemporary issues such as economic liberalisation and political 
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reform.29 My contention is that the discursive strategies of Ba’thism possessed enough 
solidity and flexibility as to continue to limit the room for manoeuvre of Syrian 
policymakers whilst offering them valuable tools with which to manage economic and 
political processes. Under Asad’s leadership, the discursive repertoire of the Ba'th was 
retained not only because it was a component of legitimacy the regime could not 
abandon, but also because it functioned as a powerful mechanism to form ‘governable’ 
subjects. So long as this functionality remained operable, Ba’thist discourse continued to 
provide the Syrian political community with common ground upon which a tacit consent 
could be assumed concerning the nature of the Syrian polity and the direction towards 
which it should move, whilst expecting an ultimate compliance with public policies. 
 
From a discursive perspective, consent and compliance are based neither on Weberian 
charisma; nor on a notion of legal-rational legitimacy; nor on hegemony defined as 
dominant ideas that appear credible and valuable.30 Each of these approaches focuses on 
instrumental elite manipulation and individual belief, both of which assume that actors 
conduct is based on conscious motivations. Discursive strategies instead operate by 
establishing norms which are prior to evaluation and belief; by constructing a subject 
which is disciplined and obedient because inscribed within these norms; by enabling 
practices which require and presuppose the active participation of a subject, whose 
choices and conducts are nevertheless predictable and governable. This kind of discursive 
'normalisation', rather than the naturalisation of the substantive ideas and ideology of a 
particular regime, accounts for the political effectiveness of discursive strategies.31 
 
Asad’s ‘corrective’ operation did not correct the disciplinary practices institutionalised by 
the previous Ba'th leadership, nor the antagonistic logic underlying Ba'thist identity 
politics. Rather, the Asad rectification started from these premises and deepened or 
intensified the power effects of Ba’thist disciplinarisation of society in order to 
reconstruct people’s identity and demobilise popular participation. In Asad’s Syria, 
established discursive mechanism continued to operate as a grid of intelligibility for 
political, social and economic realities whilst core signifiers of Ba'thism maintained their 
political instrumentality as power tools able to make citizens behaviour predictable, 
sanctionable and thereby governable. On the one hand, the network of popular 
organisations, which was created in the 1960s as a mechanism of controlled mobilisation, 
was further extended. A mass enrolment campaign was launched to ensure that the Ba'th 
party could reach every village, factory, neighbourhood and institution. The disciplining 
of citizens extended to virtually the whole of society, in an attempt to remodel the Syrian 
polity on the template of the Ba'th party, which ‘in its very infrastructure is an 
embodiment of what the community ought to be’.32 On the other hand, state management 
of the economy remained essential to make the economy operate according to a principle 
of equity and social justice embedded in the notion of the ‘national economy’. Finally, the 
privileged relation of workers and peasants to the state was not put under question. All of 
these elements were considered  ‘acquired gains’ of Ba'thism, achievements of the 
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‘blessed revolution’ that could not be questioned, let alone reversed: a tacitly agreed 
boundary that policy makers could transgress only at their own peril. Yet in the new 
economy of discourse which was being established in the 1970s, the ‘acquired gains’ also 
functioned explicitly as a threshold for what the people could consider as their ‘legitimate 
aspirations’.33 This was patent in the transformation of workers’ organisations from 
‘demanding’ (matlabi) groups into those that embodied ‘political unionism’. The former 
had no more raison d’être since Syria was already a socialist country. Therefore unions 
were no longer allowed independent action, and were turned into vehicles to transmit the 
authority’s dicta whilst acting as an instrument to see to the proper execution of decisions 
taken at higher levels.34  Other popular organisations functioned similarly. 
Asad’s new course promoted a new profile for the private sector in Syria’s commerce 
and industry, with a view towards cooperation between the public and private sectors 
and in order to give ‘every opportunity to private initiative with which our people 
abounds’.35 In Ba'thist ideology, capitalism together with feudalism, colonialism and 
imperialism, all belonged to the same cap of ‘reactionary’ forces, a multifaceted 
enemy acting without and within the country, against which ‘progressive’ forces were 
to be constantly mobilised. Asad’s policy of  ‘relaxation’ (infiraj) ad ‘openness’ 
(infitah) began to shift this line, gradually toning down the class content of the divide 
whilst opening up a venue for the incorporation of the domestic petty bourgeoisie and 
exiled businessmen, to whom Asad promised immunity and investment opportunities. 
This new course rested on a new conceptualisation of capitalism: while monopolist 
capitalism, in the hands of foreign or domestic bourgeoisie, was the arch-enemy 
deemed responsible of all setbacks, there was a second type of capitalism, non-
monopolist and compatible with nationalism, which could be brought in to give an 
impulse to the national economy. Having thus carved up a space of virtue for ‘good 
capitalists’, the state would now preserve the activities of the domestic petty 
bourgeoisie, whose activity  ‘away from exploitation and monopoly’ can contribute to 
national development.36 The incorporation of the ‘good capitalist’ into the progressive 
front was presented as a policy move which, in keeping with Ba'thist tenets, would 
neither consign the Syrian economy to foreigners nor to monopolistic capitalists. Thus 
a window was open for those Syrian businessmen who were willing to contribute to 
the ‘construction effort’, i.e. to work within the ideological and geographical 
boundaries of the Syrian Ba'thist state. 
 
The policy of openness to Syrian capitalists was an attempt to discipline businessmen, 
couched in the Ba'thist moral language of shared principles, patriotism and common 
identity. The bourgeoisie, which in Ba’th historiography ‘did not play its role’ in the 
development of the country, was now offered a new chance and a new economic 
ethic: the ‘bloc of the right, the good, the success’.37 This opening carefully avoided 
both a probe of the established discursive frontier or a snuffing of the flame of 
antagonism always present in Ba'thist revolutionary discourse. The discursive frontier 
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between the revolution and its enemies continued to work as a non-negotiable divide, 
whilst ‘good capitalists’ were asked to identify themselves with the camp of the ‘right 
and good’ and with the Ba'thist vision of the economy. The regime continued to 
depict capitalism as a potential danger for development and social cohesion. Against 
such evil, constant surveillance and struggle were necessary. Thus the ‘revolution’ 
was an ‘ongoing’ struggle, whilst the economy was still constructed as a terrain of 
conflict. 
 
After some initial success in the early 1970s, the corrective operation proved unable 
to rescue Syria from economic stagnation. Brought in, but ‘through the back door’,38 
Syrian capitalists responded with caution and mistrust the hesitant embrace of the 
government and remained reluctant to accomplish their national duties ever after.39 
Amidst this general climate of distrust, private industry expanded in some sectors 
(textile clothing, shoes, soap, handicrafts and light metal) but too man difficulties, 
‘disguised or apparent’ remained, from incompetence to structural problems.40 
Ignoring demands for greater deregulation from the business community, as well as 
the cautious critiques advanced by government agencies,41 state-run daily newspapers 
continued to show contempt for capitalists in a way that echoed 1960s anti-capitalists 
crusades, with accuses of corruption, conspiracy to destroy the public sector42 and an 
orientation towards less risky and more rewarding economic ventures. In such terms, 
the public debate revolved around social actor’s responsibilities without questioning 
either the leadership’s management or the economic vision itself. A class of ‘parasite 
capitalists’ was still publicly blamed as being responsible for the setbacks of the 
national economy. 
 
Since it was based on a discursive strategy of antagonism constructed around the 
notion of the revolution, the Asad strategy of incorporation of business in the 
development effort whilst keeping the allegiance of the Ba'th traditional constituency 
proved unable to heal the sharp social antagonism on which Syrian society had been 
based.  Growing Islamic opposition - at times violent – and criticism of governmental 
policies by business circles was met by the denunciation of ‘reactionary acts and 
sabotage’ from the regime press, along with calls for ‘more loyalty to the principles of 
fighting confessionalism, more clinging to national unity and a quicker pace behind 
the leader of the march’.43 Asad’s failure to incorporate business in the national 
endeavour does not mean that his moves were without results or consequences:  the 
general climate of mistrust and the moralisation of public life shaped the social and 
political landscape of Syria for years to come. 
The reason why capitalists could not be fully rehabilitated as a collective subject of 
the Syrian economy is not only to be found in Syria history of socialist struggles by 
‘progressive forces’ against exploitation, but also in the Ba'thist logic of the 
construction of political identities. The ‘good’ capitalists could never be discursively 
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grouped alongside with ‘the people’, because capitalists shared with this people 
neither a history of deprivation, nor the ‘struggling experience’ and  ‘levelling 
instinct’ produced by that history.44 This ‘struggling experience’ was the label, the 
symbol and the cement of ‘the people’ qua political subject:  it comprised a variety of 
demands and grievances, all legitimate and all equivalent, which marked the identity 
of ‘the people’ as a discursive subject vis-à-vis ‘reactionary forces’. Since the only 
‘wrong’ that Syrian capitalists had experienced in common with the people was 
foreign oppression, nationalism was the only common denominator grouping Syrian 
capitalists and Syrian citizens, and a nationalist stance was the only discursively 
shared demand that could form the ‘correct’ political identity. 
 
The strongly confrontational logic of Ba’thist discourse prevented a full rehabilitation 
of the business class and its unconditional inclusion in the coalition of ‘correct’ 
political forces.  Capitalism retained a sinister connection with potential exploitation, 
thereby ruining the investment climate for any potential investor; whilst private 
activity remained subordinated to state planning, and control agencies supervised its 
adherence to state economic strategies. Therefore it is not surprising that Syrian 
capitalists carefully avoided risky industrial enterprises and any possible exposure to a 
reversal of favour on the part of the regime. Syrian capital was still locked up in 
Lebanese and western banks, and private sector expansion limited to quick rewarding 
enterprises, whilst a few big businessmen gained selective entry in state monopolies 
through the establishment of joint ventures. In such an atmosphere, it was no wonder 
that leftists’ scepticism about the economic infitah of the regime and their mistrust of 
capitalists newly acquired ‘national ethic’ would only be reinforced. 
 
 
The “Strategic Parity” Equation 
 
Asad inherited from the radical Ba'th an unfinished development project as 
well as a truncated state and a defeated army: since the recovery of Golan - and with it 
of national pride – was linked to a deeper effort at economic development, a 
reworking of mobilisation strategies was also needed. From the early 1970s, official 
sources increasingly stressed the importance of the economic sector in the light of 
security objectives: development and the war effort required a restructuring of Syria 
society and a reversal of their relative importance. Syria was facing a ‘permanent 
aggression … political, military and economic’,45 therefore development was no 
longer an independent goal, but a ‘patriotic and national goal’ of all citizens tied to 
the strategic necessity to confront the enemy on an equal footing.46 The concepts of 
permanent aggression, and later of ‘the double battle for development and liberation’ 
(ma’rakat al-bina wa al-tahrir)47 embodied in the concept of ‘strategic parity’ 
(tawazun istratiji) spelled out the connection between Syria’s economy and foreign 
policy. This also justified a militarization of everyday life, exceptionalism in law and 
order, and ultimately legitimised a model of mobilisation which would substantially 
change Ba'thist ‘socialist’ socialisation. 
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Economic mobilisation involved more that an effort towards progress and victory: 
these calls were framed in an epic narrative of heroic gestures and grand passions, ‘a 
battle of life and death, the fate and existence of our Arab nation will depend on the 
outcome of this battle’.48 As all aspects of life came into the strategic parity equation, 
this slogan entailed a redefinition of popular sociability and political correctness, as 
wells as a rethinking of socialism and development. Development became a factor of 
national strength rather than an end in itself. Socialism now meant fast growth, a 
focus on production, and the exploitation of all available resources in order to resist 
aggression. One of the major themes of the corrective movement along with the 
‘defence of the public sector’ was the ‘struggle for production’ in order to meet the 
requirements of defence, steadfastness and the battle for liberation.49 It was actually a 
U turn from the principles of Ba’thist socialism, which linked production to welfare 
and explicitly ruled out accumulation ‘for the regime’ and ‘for the supremacy of the 
state over other states’.50 In this way the Arab-Israeli conflict acted as a discursive 
context for a culture of total war, economic austerity, and an irreducible antagonism: 
all these elements became part of the ‘struggling experience’ (tajruba nidhaliyye) that 
characterized politically correct identity in Asad’s Syria, and became a precondition 
for inclusion in the political alliance. Asad’s discourse increasingly turned into an 
epic, grand narrative that, by requiring all to sacrifice and struggle for ‘Syria’s 
destiny’ further disempowered them vis-à-vis the imperatives of a superior national 
cause. 
 
In another significant move from earlier Ba'thism, class struggle in Asad’s Syria came 
to be considered detrimental to the national interest, now pitted against imperialism 
and Zionism. In order to fight this ‘main battle,’ all internal contradictions had to be 
erased, because only a compact bloc would be able to resist and win.51 In the 
battlefield and in the struggle for development alike, it was unanimity of will, 
determination, and sacrifice that would lead to victory. Therefore ‘the people’ became 
an essentialised, superior collectivity purified of all contradictions and disagreements, 
and the nation became idealised as a space of innocence. The predominant concept 
was the dichotomy between reactionary and progressive forces: internal coalitions 
were no longer seen as class alliances, but as means to achieve national and social 
harmony. The Progressive National Front, formed in 1972 as an alliance of popular 
forces strictly controlled by the Ba'th, represented the transfer of classes from 
contending units into part of a totality with common interests, determination, 
responsibilities, and destinies. The endless struggle to which people were called – a 
struggle for development, for liberation, for defence, for recovery of territory and 
rights as well as for the protection of socialism, of acquired gains and of the public 
sector – all this was for them a moral responsibility as well as a valuable formative 
experience. 
 
In Asad’s Syria, the subjects of economic discourse were still discursive subjects of 
rights and principles which they had first, to acknowledge, and then, to protect or 
recover. Their history remained a linear history from backwardness to progress, but 
their role was increasingly defined by the defensive stance of protecting acquired 
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gains whilst defending the revolution and its achievements. Cast in the role of the 
guardians of the revolution, people had to accept – more than ever, in the heavy 
atmosphere of the mid 1980s – the burden of a ‘historical mission’ that required from 
them ‘efforts, fatigue and sacrifices.’ In the 1970s, the peasant, as the worker, ‘now 
works, sweats and sacrifices for his own sake and for the sake of his family, the 
country and all the citizens’.52 In the 1980s, an unconditional effort was required by 
all progressive social forces for the nation and for Syria’s destiny.53 A state that stands 
above all and demands obedience and sacrifice was the grand narrative for social 
demobilisation: the Ba'thist leadership was not interested in empowering certain 
classes, but rather intent on equally dis-empowering all sectors of society for the 
purpose of maintaining its own autonomy, of which the regime euphemism was 
‘social peace’. 
 
During the early 1970s, Asad’s ‘rectification’ amounted to a partial and selective 
openness of some ‘non strategic’ sectors of the national economy to private initiative. 
As capitalist could not be easily disciplined within the horizon of Ba’thist discourse, 
an alliance between the Ba'thist state and the bourgeoisie as a political subject could 
hardly be institutionalised. Rather, the selective, extra-institutional inclusion of part of 
the business community took the form of corruption and creation of economic 
networks.54 These developments reinforced the mutual mistrust between leftists, 
within and without government, and business circles. Asad’s ‘correction’ did not 
transform the public sector into the motor of an efficient economy, yet officially it 
remained ‘the backbone of the economy’, ‘the physical expression of socialism’ and 
‘the property of the masses’.55 As an ‘acquired gain’ of Ba'thist socialism, it was a 
duty of the people to protect it. It also continued to function as an important safety 
valve (providing employment) as well as a powerful symbol of Ba'thist sociability, 
whose demise was perceived as politically dangerous. Aside from questions of 
productivity or corruption, the public sector retained its role as a signifier of Ba’thist 
discourse: questioning its role would have endangered the whole edifice of Ba'thism, 
including the roles played by subjects of Ba'thist discourse and the practices of 
disciplinary power which were based on such an edifice. 
Crucially, Asad’s correction readdressed the nature and parameters of popular 
mobilisation and incorporation: hence one sees the turn in economic discourse from 
class confrontation to national solidarity; from a call for economic rights to be given 
to the people to a defensive stance towards the ‘acquired gains’ of the Ba'thist 
revolution. In the context of the ongoing confrontation with Israel, the new strategy of 
economic confrontation required the moralisation of economic actors, now struggling 
together as a ‘compact bloc’ to achieve the twin ends of ‘victory and progress’.56 
 
Developments in the 1980s, namely a deeper economic crisis and shortage of rents, 
meant that a development policy of grand infrastructural realisation and reallocation 
of resources was no longer feasible, and new economic measures were needed. With 
development and socialism already redefined, the economic reform of the 1980s 
revolved around the redefinition of the respective roles of the private and public 
economies. The sixth Five Year Plan (1986-1990) allowed the private sector to 
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engage in activities previously under State control and a number of incentives were 
provided to promote private investments.  Another wave of selective and cautious 
economic liberalization followed. Once again Asad stressed the consistency of his 
strategy with Ba’thism, and changes were still ideologically justified in a narrative 
that posed a continuity with the history of the Ba’thist revolution. Ba'thism continued 
to provide concepts and norms for shaping social imaginary, identities and roles, as 
well as for disciplining bodies and minds. This political instrumentality, I suggest, is 
the key to understanding the longevity of Ba'thism and the ways in which it has 
continued to provide the ground for tacit consent about the nature of the Syrian polity 
and the direction towards which it should move. In this way the regime was able to 
avoid alienating its Ba’thist original constituency, as well as to retain the normative 
and disciplinary resources that Ba'thist discourse possessed. 
 
Disciplining bodies and minds, shaping social imaginary and identity, centralising all 
authority in a state that stood above society whilst symbolising the unity of the social 
body: these practices never ceased to guide Asad’s policies. State security, prosperity 
and pride occasionally required the adjustment of alliances and policies to comply 
with different historical conditions. Nevertheless the uncompromising discursive 
frontier delimiting friend from foe, prosperity from poverty, pride from shame, did 
not change. On the contrary, it was rather the change in economic policies that was 
justified in official discourses by the necessity of keeping within these very frontiers 
whilst adapting to a different political environment. In Asad’s Syria the Ba'thist 
‘correct’ sociability remained based on an uncompromising frontier between the 
good, productive and  ‘progressive’ new man, and its ‘other:’ the parasitic, 
exploitative, reactionary capitalist/bourgeois. As such Ba’thist discourse continued to 
function as a reservoir of tools for governing. 
 
 
The rationality of Ba'thist discourse: narratives of order 
 
An analysis of Ba'th economic discourse discloses a new level of intelligibility 
of the political economy of contemporary Syria. In this discourse, a discursively 
constructed ideological, historical, moral necessity – a truth - converges with a 
political strategy that takes society as its point of application and works through 
identity policy and practices of disciplinarisation and normalisation. The birth of a 
modern economy in Syria required popular mobilisation and participation in the 
development project. Therefore governing became a matter of organising, guiding, 
leading and controlling people’s activity. More than the mere possession and 
management of wealth, the task of developmental government was the management 
of people’s conduct: people who were imbricated with wealth as producers, 
consumers, owners, and tax payers, were resource makers and thus a resource 
themselves. Against this background, the core question became one of social control:  
Ba'th policymakers saw Syria’s development in terms of how to make a modern 
economy socially possible. In the end, disciplining bodies and minds was deemed 
necessary in order to make the people capable and willing of working, whilst being 
ready for progress, and ‘worthy of the revolution’. 
 
Ba'thist discourse simplified political space by replacing a complex set of differences 
with a stark dichotomy between good and bad guys, acceptable versus aberrant 
behaviours and phenomena. As is typical of revolutionary discourse, the Ba'thist logic 
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of constitution of political identities is Manichean: it tends to group all social 
singularities around one or the other pole of the dichotomy between friend and 
enemy. The historical ‘wrongs’ experienced by various sections of the people (the 
oppressed peasant, the exploited worker, the colonised patriot, the Bedouin locked in 
a pre-modern life by ‘reactionary’ politicians) could all be considered equivalent vis-
à-vis greedy, imperialist, oppressive upper classes. The latter were themselves merged 
and grouped together as the ‘enemies of the people’. 
Fixing a constellation of issues and ‘true’ definitions around people’s history and 
identity was just one of the mechanisms of power that Ba'th discourse possessed. To 
make the country modern and developed, people had to move from ‘correct’ self 
understanding based on ‘true’ values to the adoption of appropriate conducts. A 
profound social engineering operation accompanied the modernisation of Syria and 
the development of its economy. 
 
The discursive frontier that constituted the backbone of Ba'thism was built on non-
negotiable principles and an irreducible antagonism between opposed camps and 
identities; and on principled versus immoral behaviour.  As the narrative of stolen, 
violated, negated rights painted a picture in which principles and pride belong 
squarely to one camp, it also validated the call for total ‘just’ war whenever morality 
and identity were at stake. In this way the discursive frontier functioned as a call to 
continuous struggle against an enemy that, by transgressing discursive lines and 
norms, was not just advancing competing interests, but was challenging the entire 
Ba'thist moral edifice and Syria’s social cohesion. 
The discourse that has governed Syria for decades was based on social cohesion as a 
form of collective discipline; on individual responsibility vis-à-vis the collectivity; on 
individual subjects constructed as carriers of a public morality; on a notion of society 
as both the medium and the terminal point of application of power. In this discourse, 
it is through the ‘improvement’ of the people or the re-construction of society, that it 
is possible to develop the modern economy, the developed citizen, and the powerful 
state. 
 
Asad’s Syria was governed through the moral disciplining of society: society 
understood as a moral body - an immature body, in need of guidance on the path to 
progress. The project of inculcating a ‘religion sociale’ in the Syrian social body 
presupposed a fundamental mistrust of people, who were construed as ignorant, 
backward and in need of constant education. Here lies a fundamental ambiguity in 
Ba'thist discourse: the project of constructing a populist subject independently of 
popular support. Certainly Ba’thist leaders were able to articulate and address genuine 
popular demands, but only within a paternalist and tutelary view of ‘the masses’ to 
whom they preached the Ba’thist virtues. Having turned from representing class 
interests to embodying the will of a homogeneous ‘people’, the Ba’thist regime erased 
from its political screen any possible mediation or negotiation of internal divisions in 
favour of a totalist view of power and political identity. The public display of support 
was still deemed necessary – as the theatrical demonstrations, festivals, marches, 
chants with their display of symbols and slogans demonstrate – as a disciplinary 
exercise for docile citizens. Genuine support from the people was not indispensable, 
so long as discipline and compliance were assured. 
 
Ultimately, Asad’s Syria was a seemingly ‘populist’ regime that mistrusted people, 
the very people they claimed to represent, and turned into an authoritarian rule based 
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on surveillance, mistrusts and repression. The Ba'thist revolutionary utopia eventually 
turned into a totalitarian Weltanshauung: one in which only total change can bring 
about the ideal society; change that requires total and almost heroic dedication. 
Therefore the Syrian citizen is openly asked to work, sacrifice, struggle, and even die 
in the present, for the sake of an ideal which is always in the future. 
 
A discursive perspective on Syria economic policies sheds new light on the nature and 
working of power in Ba'th Syria. In Foucault’s terms, we see a sovereign style 
political rationality and a disciplinary power that work together: governing means not 
only to maintain territory and loyalty, but also to employ tactics that would create a 
disciplined and productive population.57 Ba'thist practices of power have been 
developed in Asad’s time to the point of fusing the subjectification of economic 
agents with the creation of a public morality. In this rationality, disciplinary practices 
and sovereign concerns coexist and reinforce one another. The affirmation of abused 
rights, the struggle for the reappropriation of the stolen national wealth coincide with 
the need for constant indoctrination and ‘inculcation’ of Ba'thist wisdom. Only in a 
nationalist environment, and through a continuous ‘development of the citizen’s 
consciousness’, can the Syrian citizen become powerful agent of his own history. The 
kind of authority that such design expresses is an ever present master, above the 
people, source of ‘true’ knowledge and guidance. The personalisation of Syrian 
politics, which has gone from a bitter confrontation of societal and political groups to 
obedience to an inscrutable leader, feared but also respected for his political acumen, 
is the apotheosis of such a process of ‘moralisation’.58 
 
Asad’s transformist operation began with an attempt to shift the discursive frontier to 
the outer limits of the state, to homogenise society by denying the existence of 
domestic conflicts. The discursive construction of ‘the people’ proved solid enough to 
limit the room for manoeuvre of the Syrian leadership, preventing the full 
incorporation of subjects with dubious ‘revolutionary’ credentials into the socio-
political equation.  On the other hand, Asad’s rectifications show how ‘ideological’ 
preferences and professed allegiances do not prevent reversals of policies: as 
discursive frontiers and signifiers shift, points of power application and effects 
change.  During the late 1980s and the 1990s the operation continued with a 
rearticulation of issues and demands belonging to the revolutionary tradition, in which 
the signifiers maintain their radicalism while their content became a different one, and 
eventually the political meaning of the whole operation reversed itself. 
 
Asad’s inclusionary strategy of the bourgeoisie was intentionally pursued within the 
parameters of Ba'thist discourse for reasons other than exploiting its legitimating 
force, which was fading in the face of economic crisis and domestic repression. 
Asad’s corrections maintained the pervasive instruments of control and disciplinary 
practices institutionalised by previous Ba'thist leaderships, and used them to re-
construct people’s identity and demobilise popular participation. Keeping the power 
of discursive mechanisms deemed capable to discipline society on the one hand, 
whilst on the other, maintaining some social ‘safety valves’ and privileges for the 
popular strata that form the Ba'thist constituency, were clearly perceived as connected 
                                                
57 On the Foucaultian notions of sovereignty, discipline and government, see Foucault, 
Governmentality in Burchell, Gordon and Miller (eds.) The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality, 1991, pp. 87-104.  
58 On Asad’s cult see Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination, 1999 
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elements of a single equation. Moreover the proverbial ‘caution’ and gradualism in 
allowing change is in part due to this perceived political usefulness of Ba'thist 
signifiers that function as real mechanisms of discipline, not as simple rhetorical 
figures in which most Syrian do not believe themselves any more. 
 
 
Syrian economic reform in the 1990s 
 
While in the mid-1980s it was possible to skirt an economic crisis by a 
selective liberalisation and minimal changes in political coalitions, the general 
recession of the 1990s required a comprehensive reform, which would include the 
revision of policies of redistribution and welfare. Moreover, against a dramatically 
changed international background (end of the cold war, Soviet perestroika and then 
collapse of Soviet Union, globalising capitalism and Gulf wars) the strategic parity 
was no longer a viable option and socialism had lost its credibility. Thus the climate 
for change was ripe. 
 
The necessity of a deeper transformation was publicly recognised by the leadership 
and discussed in media and within civil society fora, which emerged at the beginning 
of the decade and became more vocal in 1997 and 1998, in a new atmosphere of 
dialogue and public discussion.59 Issues begun to emerge in public discourse, in the 
print media and in the yearly lecture series organised by the Syrian Economic 
Association, a non-government organisation that became one of the most important 
fora for democratic dialogue on economic questions. A series of articles presenting 
contending views by academics, business people and government officials about 
Syria’s reforms was published on al-Hayat in May and June 1999, and sparked a 
lively debate which pitted state officials, economists and intellectuals of various 
backgrounds against one another. 60 Principles of market economy were introduced 
into public language, and it seemed that the Syrian government was reorganising state 
agencies as well as productive sectors of the economy in order to take into account 
economic principles of efficiency and productivity.  Observers applauded at the 
beginning of the ‘retreat of the state’ from the Syrian economy. 
  
Nevertheless the economic reforms introduced in Syria the third decade of Asad’s 
rule did not mean less discipline, less intervention from above, nor a major shift in 
Asad’s governmental strategy -  despite the official introduction of a number of 
significant and non-reversible moves. The 1990s opened with the declaration of 
ta’addudiya (pluralism) and the issue of Law no.10 on investments. The decade 
unfolded amidst lively debates on the roles of public and private economic sectors, 
and on the conditions for a ‘proper’ investment climate. The launch of an experiment 
in management reform (idara bil-ahdaf) closed the last decade of Hafiz al-Asad’s 
rule. As for the previous moves (from Ba’thist socialism to tashis in the 1970s, and 
from tahsis to infitah in the mid-1980s), it would be inaccurate to evaluate these 
measures in terms of diminishing state intervention and increasing freedom for 
societal and economic dynamics. 
 
                                                
59 See the Syrian Economic Association yearly publication: Nedwa al-Thulatha’ al-Iqtisadiyya 
(Economic Tuesday Symposium; henceforth Nedwa) and website (Syrianeconomy.com) 
60  Al-Hayat, 14 and 15 May 1999: the papers were initially prevented from entering Syria, then 
few days later were sold everywhere in the country.  See Haddad, cit., p 242 
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The rigidities and poor performances of the public sector had been an issue in Syria 
since the 1960s, with endless debates revolving around the impediments and obstacles 
to the optimal working of such sector. In the 1990s, with the formula of ta’addudiya61 
the leadership officially indicated a willingness to reconsider the relation between the 
sectors of the economy, and a new wave of liberalisation measures followed. 
Economic pluralism as a strategy for the Syrian economy was hardly a novel move in 
Syrian political economy. From the very first days of tahsis (correction) the regime 
had placed emphasis on adopting pluralism in the development process, and on giving 
each sector a role ‘according to its capacity, which changes, therefore the rules that 
govern them change, hence there were consecutive investment legislations to suit 
changing capacities’.62 Echoing declarations made in earlier years, economic 
pluralism was said to rest on three pillars: ‘the leading role of the public sector, the 
private sector role as an essential partner, and the mixed sector as an approach to 
cooperation between the public and private sectors’.63 The shift from a centralised to a 
pluralist economy did not dispense from ‘holding tight to all that is national (qawmi) 
and moral in the context of Arab political discourse’.64 Pluralism was presented once 
more as an independent Syrian choice ‘imposed by the national will’.65 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, leading policymakers reiterated the familiar line that 
the public sector was ‘a duty, not a failed experiment to be discarded’, and that 
planning and optimisation of resources remained state concern.66 As for the role of the 
private sector, only when it agrees to ‘take up a greater responsibility in building up 
the country, will the doors be open for political participation’.67 The regime did 
acknowledge the existence of problems, yet five years later Syrian economists still 
maintained that, not just keeping the state sector, but continuing its expansion and 
maintaining its monopoly in essential sectors remained the most important 
characteristic of the Syrian economy.68 By the end of the 1990s, the official stand was 
that ‘the planned economy and the market economy are good neighbours’ and the 
party leadership refused to dissolve the public sector by means of privatisation.69 
Maintaining the policy of ‘social support, even if reduced in some areas’ and keeping 
the policy of tariff protection for the inefficient national industry appeared to be the 
preferred policy line for the time being.70 
 
Syrian economists and businessmen not linked with the regime gave a different 
picture of the state of national business: Riad Saif called for urgent policies to ‘save 
the private industrial sector’, after years of marginalisation and restrictions in the form 
of licensing requirements; diversion of raw materials; placing obstacles to importation 
of industrial machinery; making financial support unavailable; imposing high taxes 
and tariffs on locally distributed products; and ‘tormenting’ entrepreneurs with special 
                                                
61 The term figured prominently in Asad’s inauguration speech in 1991 
62 Abdel Nur in al-Thawra, 15 and 19 February 1997, quoted in Abdel-Nur, Dawr al-Ajhiza al-
Hukumiyya fi zhill Aliyat al-Suq, in Nedwa, cit., 1999 
63 Fouad al-Sayed, Economic Pluralism: Future Perspectives, in Nedwa, cit., 2001 
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67 Imadi, opening speech at the Damascus International Fair, in Sirie et Monde Arabe, 1990 
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69  economist and party member Naser Obeid on the pages of the governmental al-Ba'th al-
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70 Seifan, in Abdel Nur, cit. 
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legislation such as  the Security Tribunal and Decree 24 targeting their activity.71 The 
introduction of selective and limited reform of this ‘chronically diseased’ body could 
not reverse the situation: thus the private sector expanded, but remained ‘unhealthy’. 
Nevertheless selective deregulation, rather than structural reform or other potentially 
destabilizing strategies, became the chosen path to liberalisation, as the government 
saw a way out of economic stagnation by spurring the industrialisation process. The 
centrepiece of liberalisation in the 1990s was the new Investment Law no.10 of 1991 
that welcomed international investors. The law represented an important turn from 
state tutelage to the encouragement of private initiative. Under the provision of the 
law, retention and private use of foreign exchange was legalised for the first time, 
whilst tax exemptions and other privileges were granted to investors with the aim of 
attracting foreign capital. Investment Law No.10 was widely considered the starting 
point of an incremental reform process, which was going in the direction of economic 
liberalisation and a diminished role for the state sector.72 Many agreed that ‘Syria is 
de facto exchanging the model of a centrally planned economy for that of a free 
market’.73 
 
The symbol of Syrian economic liberalisation, Law No.10 turned into little more than 
token gesture of good intentions. For years it stood alone with no efforts made to 
harmonise it with conflicting legislation, in particular the notorious Legislative 
Decree 24. The mixed results of the introduction of Law No. 10, as well as its 
shortcomings and adaptations, were presented as stemming from the halt of the peace 
process with Israel. Along the same lines, the debate on the investment climate in 
Syria showed a contradiction between an apparent consensus on the necessity to open 
up to international investment, and the inability to relax the heavy climate of 
suspicion of foreign ‘interference’.74 Despite acknowledging the constraints built into 
the Syrian political system (bureaucratic obstruction, corruption, an inadequate 
banking system, a multiplicity of exchange rates), public debates continued to raise 
nationalistic suspicions of reasons behind a foreign interest, or indeed disinterest, in 
investing in the country.75 
 
In general, economic policies in Asad’s Syria seemed to follow a trend of gradual 
opening to private capitalism. From the complementary role accorded the private 
sector in the 1970s as a banner of economic pluralism76, to the strategy of cooperation 
between public, private and mixed sectors in the 1980s,77 to finally the competition 
between them78, each stage of liberalisation or open-door policy appears as a 
gradually widening of the opening and a corresponding shrinking of the state 
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economic sector.  Several indicators confirmed the new trend towards liberalism.79 By 
the end of the 1990s, well-informed observers in Damascus gave a disillusioned 
picture of the state of the economy.80 Syria had a mixed economy in which private 
enterprise coexisted with a large public sector in a still heavily regulated environment. 
A closer look at the private sector proved discouraging: small and medium enterprises 
were still heavily hampered by the inefficiencies of the banking sector, anachronistic 
import and export laws, and a constant struggle for licences authorisations and foreign 
exchange. A relatively successful oligopolistic private sector was formed by a group 
of firms belonging to a small number of businessmen closely linked to the political 
establishment, who appeared to be in the best position to profit from the partial 
liberalisation carried since 1991. Informal networks of private-public ties, already 
established in the 1980s, almost completely monopolised the largest new enterprises, 
enjoying tailored benefits and protection. After a decade of official liberalisation, the 
only thriving sector in Syria was the informal economy: this was formed from a cross 
section of Syrian society composed of those who had learned to circumvent the 
existing jungle of regulations, as a result of a connivance between private individuals 
and state officials – called ‘sharks and dinosaurs’ in Syrian jargon -with a personal 
interest in bypassing legislation and state control.81 This ‘sector’ represented an 
important element of flexibility in the system, playing the role of shock absorber and 
safety valve in areas such as finance and import trade. In conclusion, Law 10 of 1991 
and economic pluralism led to the creation of ‘a process of transferring protection and 
monopolies from the public sector to individuals in the private sector’.82 
These developments give another dimension to the claim that the public sector was 
not a failed experiment to be discarded, but one that ‘has been made to fail’.83 
Supporters of a direct role of the state in the economy – among whom minister Zaim 
and a number of Syrian economists – complained on many occasions that the public 
sector was filled with underpaid and under qualified personnel, who were 
overburdened by bureaucratic routine. Less often criticism was openly directed at the 
collusion between corrupted politicians and businessmen, hinting at their vested 
interest in preventing reform of the public sector. Ultimately, the Syrian way to 
liberalisation produced an effective decrease in the role of the state sector, but the 
emerging private sector was private only in name, being protected de facto 
economically and politically by the proximity of its owners to the top echelons of 
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power.84 In the end, the Syrian version of state capitalist accumulation appeared to 
have benefited neither society, nor the state qua state.85 
 
Confronting the problem of the rigidities and poor performance of the public sector 
had been an important issue since Asad’s takeover. Administrative reform in the 
1970s and 1980s focused on lifting ‘barriers’ and external impediments; occasional 
anti-corruption crusades; and the tightening of hierarchical control and popular 
indoctrination in order to ‘overcome the bureaucratic mentality’ responsible for all 
setbacks in the public sector. Unsurprisingly the state agency called ‘rakaba wa 
taftish’ (roughly ‘control and supervision’) had been the most authoritative office in 
the public sector ever since. In the 1990s, the rigidities of the administrative apparatus 
continued to be problematised in rampant disciplinary terms as incorrect behaviour on 
part of the individual civil servant, thereby requiring stricter supervision and more 
indoctrination. The problem of corruption as well was seen as a purely moral failure 
with collateral economic damage: the result of a ‘faulty’ understanding of higher 
national issues and individual responsibilities, remote from any technical or structural 
consideration. As late as 1999 the ‘phenomenon of negligence’ remained the central 
question.86 Eschewing questions of transparency and legality, ‘love of work’ within 
the frame of ‘patriotic loyalty’ was considered the necessary condition for optimal 
administrative management of the bureaucratic state.87 
 
Striving to find a way to ‘rehabilitate’ the public sector, Syrian reformers during the 
late 1990s introduced the method called ‘management by objective’ (al-idara bil-
ahdaf) in a few public companies.88 This model was geared to the optimisation of 
performance and efficiency through setting goals for each administrative position, 
whilst granting financial and administrative independence and accountability 
measured according to results. In the Syrian experiment, managers of a few selected 
enterprises were granted a limited independent room for manoeuvre within a tight 
hierarchical system of control.89 Despite the small scale of the experiment, and it 
relative success, many were opposed because ’it hinted at a road they did not want to 
walk’.90 By addressing practices of power centralisation, the experiment called into 
question the very concept of authority: the modernisation of managerial 
administrative methods could not be pursued without a modernisation of concepts and 
methods of rakaba (control, supervision, surveillance). In the end, this modernisation 
of managers was abandoned, the Syrian managerial system remained alienated from 
the productive process, a pyramidal power structure in which hierarchical ties had to 
predominate over the autonomy of managers, whose only task was to pass orders and 
supervise the implementation of directives.  If anything, the Management by 
Objectives experiment proved that the leadership was not prepared to move on from a 
concept of authority based on power radiating from a centre and to consider reforming 
the antiquated structure of control. 
                                                
84 For criticism of a private sector that is not private, see Abdel-Nur, Al-Qita’ al- Khass fi Zhill al-
Himaya, in  Nedwa, cit., 2000.  
85 Haddad, cit. p. 280 
86 Abdalla Tulba, The Phenomenon of Negligence in the Administration of Developing Countries, 
(in Arabic) in Fikr Siyasy, 1999 
87 Salama, cit. 
88 A management  method introduced by Drucker in 1954 
89 On a total of 7 companies, 4 companies were in the textile sector, see Salama, cit. 
90 ibid 
 28 
 
 
Reading the infitah-s: authoritarian governmentality 
 
The common reading of the evolution of Syrian economic policies privileges 
the relation between the public and private sectors, and is aimed at demonstrating how 
economic openness was used as a stick or carrot to domesticate business circles.  
Another possible reading of the various infitah-s could view them as an incremental 
demobilisation strategy. In the 1970s, Asad’s power consolidation strategy consisted 
of balancing bourgeoisie and populist interests by bringing businessmen back into 
esteem. By selectively opening to the private sector and establishing the mixed sector, 
the public sector itself would be stimulated to work more efficiently. Part of this 
strategy was to set national goals above workers’ interests, thus promoting a strategy 
of taking a step back in social progress and two steps ahead in patriotic struggle. 
Cohesion and solidarity within the Syrian polity replaced class divisions; 
‘pragmatism’ or realignment with regional powers was framed in the nationalist 
narrative; maintaining the socialist/leftist identity of Syrian socialism was the winning 
card to obtain support and cooperation from the Soviet bloc. 
 
The end of the 1970s saw a new economic crisis, which fuelled an Islamic rebellion. 
The regime was posed against the business class, but acknowledged the necessity of 
economic reform. In the mid 1980s, Asad retained power by resorting to a new infitah 
and a rearticulation of Ba’thist discourse. Since the public sector had exhausted its 
propelling force as a stimulus for the economy, the regime resorted to a self- imposed 
austerity, deregulation, and labour intensive projects. This was accompanied by an 
even more tightly controlled disciplininarisation  - extending the grip of control 
agencies to virtually all aspects of social life  - and a deeper ‘moralisation’ of 
discursive subjects and public life.  One can view this paternalistic moralisation of 
society as a balance to the adverse effects of economic measures on workers and 
employees, caught between inflation and a salary freeze. This second track of public-
private strategy, what is called ‘balanced political decompression’, was still merely an 
opening directed towards the domestic sector rather than an approach to the world 
economy. It was designed to integrate the bourgeoisie, whilst minimising the 
alienation of populist forces. The regime saw it as a selective, reversible liberalisation, 
and continued to view development as national strength. 
 
During the 1990s, changes in the international system of bipolarity and globalisation 
with no Soviet alternative resulted in Syria’s alignment with the West in the Gulf war 
of 1991; a more substantial political decompression; a corporatist – rather than 
pluralist – strategy of business incorporation;  and an opening to international 
capitalism. To get rich and consume was no longer a reproach as president Asad 
himself made clear.91 The third infitah had several economic aspects: making Syria a 
tourist destination, building the oil industry, inviting private investment without 
national restrictions. But the tilt towards the private sector was in large part 
misleading, as the beneficiaries of the liberalisation wave were individuals colluding 
with the regime, who were in a position to take advantage of the new opening.  
Liberalisation measures, such as Law No. 10, resulted in massive investment in the 
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early 1990s, but either in non-productive sectors or in sectors protected from 
competition.  All this ‘gives a nuanced meaning to ‘private sector’.92 
 
In the 1990s, the language of public life changed in small ways. Spokesmen for the 
regime now made elaborate arguments for the democratic nature of Syrian politics, 
and the pluralism of its economy. The fact that these claims were offered might 
suggest something of a change in the political climate, but uncrossable barriers 
remained and a clear resistance to liberalisation came from not only the party 
leadership, but also unionised workers, public employees, peasants, and some 
intellectuals.  The main concern of these circles was to maintain existing policies of 
social welfare, which liberalisation threatened.93 The Syrian press exhorted citizens to 
have ‘patience not to rush in the opening journey… lest the transformation turn into 
chaos’.94 Criticisms of the reduction in social spending were not suppressed, but Asad 
warned Syrians that freedom had to be pursued within the ‘framework of 
responsibility’ and not that of ‘contradiction and fragmentation’.95 In this view, social 
disruption and chaos were associated with the market, while the protection of social 
cohesion and stability, which is a duty of the state, requires a rationalisation of the 
market.  At the end of the 1990s the main lines of the Syrian economic reform were: 
to keep the state economic sector, continue its expansion and maintain its monopoly 
in strategic sectors; to maintain the policy of social support, even if reduced in some 
areas; to retain the policy of tariff protection on national industry.96 
 
One could argue that the professed ideological commitments of the regime provide an 
explanation for the preference of its leaders to maintain its autonomy from the 
bourgeoisie. As a result Ba'thist rhetoric constrained the leadership and prevented the 
institutionalisation of a state-bourgeoisie alliance. Yet by the late 1990s, as networks 
of ‘sharks and dinosaurs’ became the loci of power in Syria, it is hardly convincing to 
say that Ba'thist discourse could still have a legitimating function. The regime could 
certainly not afford to dispense with the party and its organised base in the absence of 
a substitute for this constituency. Yet by using the discursive – rather than ideological 
– resources of Ba’thism, this same regime proved able to impose a significant reversal 
of socialist policies whilst controlling potential opposition. It did not demand that the 
demobilised and disciplined society now present in Syria believe in market laws as a 
substitute to Ba’thist ideology or socialism, but nonetheless expected this society to 
comply with decisions sent down from on high regarding a turn –tashih, infitah, islah- 
in the direction of the national economy. Similarly, it is difficult to maintain that, at a 
time when Syria ruled de facto by a restricted jama’a largely autonomous from 
institutional accountability, and controlled by a multiplicity of security agencies, the 
purported alliance of Ba'thist governments with their populist constituency meant that 
the regime could less easily afford to offend mass opinion.97 It could as well be 
argued that only a Ba'thist leadership could ask from the people that they shoulder 
‘national responsibilities’ and show ‘steadfastness’ in times of austerity.  In the end, 
even considering the limited room for manoeuvre made available by populist 
commitments, Asad had been able to institute a veritable transformist programme. 
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Moreover, this had been carried out within a Ba’thist matrix, using the disciplinary 
resources made available by Ba’thist discourse. 
 
The questions raised by these remarks are important and intriguing. The relationship 
between rhetoric, ideology and politics is as ancient as Aristotle, and keeps 
resurfacing in Syrian studies and studies of authoritarianism. A difficulty here lies in 
the notions of rhetoric and ideology:  Syria’s modern history shows that professing an 
ideology does not pose ideological limits to the leadership’s action. If there is a 
continuity in the history of Ba’thism, it is more visible at the level of discursive 
strategies of social discipline, rather than in ideological consistency. The ‘open door’ 
policies were indeed part of a strategy that ‘closed the door’ to socialist 
transformation. Yet ‘the revolution’ as a Ba'thist signifier of antagonism to 
reactionary forces was retained. An analysis of Syrian economic discourse has shown 
that Asad was able to steer the direction of Syrian politics using a strategy of identity 
re-shaping, for which Ba’thist discourse provided the tools.  Far from discarding 
them, Asad used the discursive norms governing the dynamic of Ba'thist identity 
politics: the ideological and policy revision led by Asad shifted discursive frontiers, 
but the frontier itself, was actually reinstalled and reinforced by his corrections. For 
virtually each policy move, Asad provided an ideological justification which, 
convincing or otherwise, interpellated or recalled the Ba'thist constellation of issues 
and norms. The Ba'thist discursive subject of revolutionary action was kept alive in 
Asad’s Syria because, as subject of a discourse build around normative notions of 
antagonism, ‘principled’ action and hierarchical power, s/he could be invested with 
the capacity and willingness to ‘believe, obey and sacrifice’; thereby s/he could be 
disciplined and controlled.  In short, Ba'thist discourse was not abandoned because it 
was perceived as offering an array of mechanisms for producing ‘docile subjects’ and 
a disciplined society.98 These mechanism, I would argue, rather than ideological 
commitments or a feeling of solidarity (although these cannot be ruled out), acted as 
resources for governing, as well as limitations of the room for manoeuvre for all the 
subjects acting within this discursive horizon, including the ‘vanguard’, the qa’id and 
even the opposition. 
 
 
“Authoritarian Civilities” 
 
Another aspect of the production of docile, governable subjects relates to the 
political appropriation of signifiers, symbols and narratives. The appropriation on the 
part of Asad’s regime of a discourse centred on the notion of ‘revolution’ as a master 
signifier organising all meanings - from ‘true’ social action to history - deprived the 
opposition of the possibility to express their grievances in a ‘revolutionary’ language, 
which would be typical of anti-regime discourse. Those who were opposed to Asad’s 
remaking of Ba'thism, and those who were threatened by economic liberalisation, ‘did 
not have a populist ideology of protest ready for appropriation’ not only because 
‘Marxism was discredited, and political Islam... espoused a free market ideology’99 
but also because they were deprived of the ‘revolutionary’ symbols and language, 
which remained the preserve of the Ba'thist regime. 
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The hegemonic grip of Ba'thist discourse on Syrian society is a highly debatable 
issue. It has been observed that, despite the authoritarian character – at times brutal- 
of Asad’s rule, Syrian society has not been atomised (Hinnebusch) or disciplined 
(Wedeen) in the same way as Western societies. Yet the traces of Ba’thist disciplinary 
power are visible in the social fabric: fear, cynicism and suspicion are the result of the 
constant indoctrination and daily exposure the repertoire of disciplinary practices of 
the Syrian regime. Of greater even importance, authoritarian practices – including the 
dissemination of Ba'thist hegemonic discourse – had the effect of creating compliance 
and a degree of self censorship.100As people have learned that corruption is the norm, 
they are willing to tolerate degrees of illegality and even praise this conduct as 
shatara (cleverness). Mistrust is so engrained in Syrian society that everyone in a 
position of authority – or successful in private enterprises- is automatically suspected 
of being a protégé of the regime. The same applies to bureaucrats or intellectuals who 
propagate a reformist line: by so doing, others suspect them of having compromised 
their own independence.101 Authoritarian governments form citizens who dissimulate 
and pretend, whilst conforming without believing:  such conduct is operative in 
maintaining the regime in.102such widespread attitudes in Syrian society help to 
explain why the civil society movement which emerged in 2000 after the death of 
Hafiz al-Asad was apparently unable to seize the moment and draw active popular 
support. 103 
 
Moreover it could be argued that part of the opposition actually articulates its 
grievances and demands within the discourse horizon provided by the regime. The 
discursive frontier is so deeply rooted in Syria that each party tends to view the 
relationship in zero-sum terms: advances on one side are automatically considered to 
be losses for the other side.104  The Syrian thinker Tayyeb Tizini noted that there is a 
tendency to view the struggle for change as one between two opposing side only.105 
By acritically replicating the binary (friend/foe) construction of possible subject 
positions disseminated by Ba’thist discourse, the whole issue of change is reduced to 
the objective of removing the ruling group from power with little understanding of the 
subtlety of such power, let alone the infiltration of disciplinary power into Syrian 
political culture - and how to understand it and confront it.  The vision of change is 
top down, and all action remains state oriented. This is an important dimension of 
authoritarian power, often neglected or worse, mistaken for an inherited cultural trait, 
an unchanging Arab mind, or an Islamic relict. 
 
The Syrian poet and intellectual Adonis has expressed a concern with the influence of 
religion as one of the reason for Syrian political and cultural stagnation.106 This 
concern is echoed in western quarters, where frequently religious fundamentalism is 
associated with all negative aspects attributed to Islamic culture, with a spectrum 
extending from sex discrimination to terrorism. An analysis of Ba’thist economic 
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discourse shows that the constellation of issues that characterises this discourse 
comprises many fikra musabbaka (pre-concept) that are nevertheless neither an 
Islamic nor a traditional cultural heritage. Rather these are very much a characteristic 
of Syrian modernity:  their genealogy points to modern faiths such as nationalism and 
revolutionary progress, linked to state building and modern imagined communities – 
as well as to an array of discursive norms used for the definition of true and false, 
friend and foe, progressive and reactionary, which have become deeply ingrained into 
the way in which Syrians understand the world and themselves. 
 
The necessity of authoritarian governments in developing countries is spelled out in 
Fikr Siyasi in crystal clear words: ‘Countries of the Third World need a political 
leadership that can make its peoples accept, under the banner of higher national 
interest, to start being doubtful of old negative behaviour’.107 A discursive analysis of 
Ba’thism suggests that the possibility of Syria moving beyond the present impasse 
requires a move away from a totalist revolutionary discourse - centred on antagonism 
- to one which allows re-negotiation or mediation of the various forces and interests 
present in the country. 
 
Whilst there are all indications that there is in Syria a general consensus on the 
necessity to change, it is not yet clear what the paradigm of ‘transition’ means in 
Syrian political discourse. The top echelons of the regime and their big businessmen 
protégées are prepared to take advantage of the country’s economic resources under 
this dirigiste system as well as under one with a more liberal market. They understand 
that a richer economy would present more opportunities for accumulation of wealth 
and power with possibly less risk of domestic discontent or external pressures, if not 
direct intervention. A turn-over of the leadership cadets from military academia into 
private business, and a degree of privatisation were already occurring under the 
shadow of Asad’s regime. What the leaderships seemed unable to do (and still cannot 
do) is a qualitative leap from a practice of power based on surveillance, prohibition, 
negation and authoritarian control to the governmental technologies of power that, in 
the western model, underpin a successful market economy. This move would require 
a re-problematisation of the discursive field of the economy and a break with the 
notion of an essentialised society as the field of operation of government. Only when 
this threshold had been passed, the regime will be able to discard the institutional, 
coalitional and distributive arrangements that are the defining features of its populist 
authoritarian rule. 
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It’s the Mentality, Stupid: Syria’s Turn to the Private Sector 
 
By Kjetil Selvik108 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
“The private sector has become the citadel of progress and development in the country…”109 
 
Syria is in the course of becoming a “social market economy”. Like other socialist 
republics before it and especially those of a populist-authoritarian nature110, this process 
confronts the Ba‘th regime with a triple, economic, political and ideological, challenge. 
Economically, it exposes long-protected actors and institutions to market forces and 
international competition. Politically, it puts strains on the rulers’ alliance with peasants 
and workers as the latter tend to be negatively affected by economic liberalization (at 
least in the short term). Ideologically, it compromises the legitimisation formula of those 
in power as the original claim to serve the popular classes is undermined by increasing 
support for the private sector. 
 
The fundamental question is how to handle market adjustment when your ideological 
legacy and political set-up is marked by antipathy to capitalism and the bourgeoisie.111 
China – which notwithstanding fundamental differences from Syria is one of Bashar al-
Asad’s role models – has dealt with this dilemma in a head-on and interesting manner. 
The father of China’s economic opening, Deng Xiaoping, argued that economic growth 
took precedence over equality in a primitive economy, because “there is no such thing as 
socialism and communism with poverty”.112 In the name of development and China’s 
international dignity, he then went on to introduce Maoist-anathema tools like private 
ownership, differential wages, unequal wealth distribution and foreign investments to 
improve productivity and output. Far from turning to capitalism, this was for Deng a 
strengthening of socialism (or what he called “socialism with Chinese characteristics”) as 
                                                
108 Assistant Professor at the Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages, University of 
Oslo, and researcher at Fafo Institute of Applied International Studies.  
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it assured the longevity of the system. As long as the communist party stayed in power, 
China was only moving closer to real socialism.113 
 
Like China, Syria seeks to combine economic reform with political stability. This paper 
argues that selective economic reform has been a survival strategy for the Asad regime 
since the early 1970s. While preserving stability-enhancing features of the old order like 
subsidies and the size of the state administration, the leadership has allowed for a 
lopsided liberalization of rules and regulations for the private sector. It thus aims to 
address the two main downsides of the Syrian economy – low investment rates and 
falling productivity – through the mobilization of private capital. This ambition finds its 
ideological counterpart in the call for a “mindset change”.114 According to a frequently 
stated opinion among businessmen and technocrats, 45 years of socialism has created a 
legacy of practices and mentalities that inhibit economic growth. Bolstering the private 
sector is thus believed to herald a “cultural change”. 
 
The aim of this paper is to give a fieldwork-based assessment of the reform process 
through interviews with private entrepreneurs and, more particularly, to identify 
leading themes in the Syrian discourse on reform.115 Our starting point is the 
recognition that Syria’s turn to the private sector is more than an economic process; it 
also involves important ideological and political rearrangements as explained above. 
The report provides insight to these changes through an overall interpretation based 
on secondary sources (part I) and a first-hand analysis of businessmen’s behaviour 
and discourse (part II). As players in an economy dominated by political actors and 
subject to strict state control, the entrepreneurs are likely to remain conformist. Their 
discourse can therefore shed light on dominating thoughts and ideological trends. On 
the other hand – within the borders of the political acceptable – businessmen also 
have their margin of action. Their discourse is thus also the expression of a social 
group promoting its interests and opinions. Indeed, as we shall see, the entrepreneurs’ 
ideals are breaking with the Ba‘thist ideological legacy on a certain number of issues. 
 
Part One: The State 
 
The politics of selective economic reforms 
 
The history of market adjustment in Syria dates from the very first years of the 
Asad dynasty. When Hafiz al-Asad gained control of the system in 1970 he broke with 
the revolutionary socialism of his predecessors and relaxed relations with the private 
sector. From this initial peace with the bourgeoisie to Bashar al-Asad move towards a 
social market economy, Syria’s economic reform has always happened within the broader 
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aim of regime consolidation.116  It has sought to generate private capital as substitute for 
dwindling state resources, and rally previously discontented groups to the regime by 
offering ways of enrichment. In periods of comfortable state revenues like the 1970s and 
the “oil surge” of the early 1990s, the pace of reforms has been slow. Conversely, the 
regime has responded to shocks like the 1986 fiscal crisis, a near bankruptcy in the late 
1990s and the 2003-2005 regional turmoil by speeding up reforms. Even then, however, 
has Syrian economic liberalization been far more gradual than in most other Arab 
countries (to say nothing of post-1989 Eastern Europe or China). 
 
Exhaustion of a development model 
 
Syria’s slow but steady market adjustment has its roots in a regime and development 
model threatened by exhaustion. The original populist arrangement whereby the state 
provided for peasants and workers in return for political acquiescence and support in 
its fight against the West and the upper classes has been undermined by dwindling 
state resources and falling productivity.117 The turning point in this respect was the 
1986 fiscal crisis. Until then, the state had been the undisputed motor of the economy, 
serving at the time as entrepreneur, employer and investor. State monopolies in key 
economic areas like manufacturing and foreign trade had kept the private sector small, 
while inflow of development aid from the Arab Gulf states and the Soviet Union had 
allowed for constant expansions in the public sector. When the inflow of external 
resources decreased as a cause of falling oil prices in the 1980s, the state ran into a 
severe foreign exchange crisis. This again produced shortages in the import-
dependent productive sectors and threw Syria into recession. 
 
The government responded by introducing an economic reform program along two main 
axes. On the one hand, it targeted public expenditures to curtail the budget deficit. The 
thus far expanding Syrian state embarked on a course of austerity by cutting wages, 
reducing subsidies and downscaling public investments.118 On the other hand, the state 
delegated an increasing part of its developmental responsibilities to the private sector. 
Through what is usually referred to as the second Syrian infitah, the legal business 
framework was gradually liberalized to give room for private investments. 
 
The definite breakthrough for private capital was the promulgation of a new investment 
law in 1991, through which most sectors of the Syrian economy including manufacturing 
industry were opened for local as well as foreign investors. As a consequence of the 
liberalization, the relative strength of the private sector improved significantly. By 1990, 
gross private investments, which had dropped to less than 30 percent in the 1960s and 
only slightly improved in the 1970s, exceeded those of the public sector.119 The change 
could be observed through the rise of a “new class” of entrepreneurs who thrived from 
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political contacts and preferential treatment.120 Leading businessmen like ‘Utman al’ 
‘A’idi, Saib Nahhas and ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Attar built private empires in the tourism and 
transportation sectors.121 
 
The early 1990s were good years for the Syrian economy. Large deposits of high-quality 
oil was discovered in the late 1980s and by 1995 output had been brought to 610 000 
barrels per day.122 Syria also received generous financial compensation from Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for having sided with the Coalition forces in 
the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis. Rentier income joined with rising investor confidence to 
produce an average yearly growth rate of 7 percent in the first half of the 1990s.123 To 
transform this fortuitous conjuncture to sustainable export-led growth for Syria would 
however have required more structural reforms, which under Hafiz al-Asad never came. 
Instead, the president froze the reform process to concentrate on the emerging peace 
negotiations with Israel. As long as the relation to Syria’s intimate enemy had not been 
settled, he was not going to risk economic destabilization at home. Oil revenues had also 
removed the feeling of urgency by temporarily solving the foreign exchange crisis. But 
from 1996, fortune started to change as Syria entered years of decreasing oil production, 
falling oil prices, fading private investment and drought. The economic nadir was reached 
in 1999 with a growth rate of - 3,6 percent. With substantial population increase in the 
same period, average GDP per capita growth in the period 1997-2002 was zero.124 
 
 
Bashar al-Asad under pressure 
 
 The combination of windfall gains and a favourable regional situation during 
the early 1990s should in principle have made economic reform easier. But it would 
take another period of political turbulence before the reforms again picked speed. 
Bashar al-Asad’s first five years in power were replete with political challenges. 
Relations with Israel were strained with the outbreak of the second Palestinian 
intifada in September 2000, and the Israeli withdrawal from South-Lebanon 
simultaneously increased criticism of Syria’s presence in that country. In the USA, 
9/11 and the subsequent “war on terror” led to a tougher stance on Syria’s relations 
with Hezbollah, Hamas and militant Palestinian groups in exile. After the military 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Bush administration made thinly veiled threats that Syria 
could be next. In 2004, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1559, which 
called for the end of Syrian occupation of Lebanon and the disarmament of 
Hezbollah. After the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri 
in February 2005, the Syrians were forced to leave. 
 
In this context of regional crisis, whereas political liberalization was put on hold in 
the name of stability, economic liberalization actually intensified from 2004. The 
explanation should be sought in a combination of economic, personal and political 
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factors. Economically speaking, the prime mover was reports that Syrian oil wells are 
facing depletion. With crude oil output falling to 370 000 barrels per day in 2007, and 
domestic consumption growing, Syria for the first time in years became a net oil 
importer.125 According to estimates by International Energy Agency, output will drop 
to 300 000 barrels per day by 2012 unless new reserves are developed or explored.126 
 
Outside pressure generated by developments in Lebanon and Iraq at the same time 
posed an existential threat, and created a feeling of urgency in Damascus. Dwindling 
oil revenues are in themselves alarming, but under conditions of war-like international 
isolation, they become a huge liability. Generating foreign exchange by increasing 
economic efficiency and mobilizing private capital thus became a matter of national 
security. The 2003 US invasion of Iraq and 2004 Hariri assassination may in this 
respect well have accelerated market adjustment in Syria.127 
 
In terms of pull factors, economic deregulation bore promise of attracting Foreign 
Direct Investment from the bourgeoning Gulf economies. Since the beginning of the 
second oil boom in 2000, FDI in the Arab World has increased more than tenfold, 
driven by Gulf investors with unprecedented capital reserves and a preference for 
regional over Western investment locations after 9/11.128 For Syria, this offers the 
double opportunity of creating new sources of revenue and bypassing American 
economic sanctions. As of 2008, the four main sources of FDI in Syria were Saudi-
Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, and Turkey. 
 
Personal and political factors added to economic realities to reinvigorate the reform 
process. The 2004 acceleration of market adjustment coincides with the designation 
of the energetic and ambitious ‘Abdallah Dardari to head the State Planning 
Commission. Dardari came to the job from a leader-position in the United Nation 
Development Program (UNDP), and brought with him a well-formulated vision of the 
benefits of economic liberalization. He gained the ear of the President who in the 
same period started to emerge as a stronger leader. 
 
Having outlived the first challenging years as his father’s successor, Bashar al-Asad 
gradually imposed his will on “old guard” politicians and replaced several of them 
with younger technocrats. The eviction of strongmen like Vice-President and Foreign 
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Minister ‘Abdulhalim Khaddam, Army General Hikmat Shehabi and Security Chief 
Ghazi Kanaan especially improved the President’s steering capacity. Bashar’s 
consolidation process culminated with the June 2005 Ba’th Congress that declared 
Syria’s march towards a social market economy. 
 
In modernizing the Syrian economy, Bashar al-Asad moreover found a legitimization 
formula and political mission. It offered an opportunity to redress his reformist 
credentials after the crackdown on the 2000-2001 “Damascus spring” movement. By 
substituting economic liberalization for the abandoned political opening, Bashar al-
Asad could claim that he was still a progressive moderniser. From now on, faced with 
“terrorism” and external threats against his country, he would simply switch 
development focus to political stability and the economy. His credibility as 
moderniser was strengthened by his young age, intellectual appearance, technical 
interest and background as president of the Syrian Computer Society. In the words of 
his most intimate Western observer and biographer, what he [Bashar] wants is a 
society where everyone will know how to set up a computer, turn it on, and operate 
it”.129 
 
Last but not least, the regime would gain support from proponents of economic 
liberalization in the business community. It also hoped to co-opt wider parts of the 
private sector through business opportunities. The predominance of Sunnis (and 
Christian Orthodox) among Damascus’ traditional bourgeoisie gave the strategy a 
special attraction in the eyes of the ‘Alawi leadership: By rallying the bourgeoisie to 
the regime through market adjustment, it hoped to appease anger with the perceived 
‘Alawi monopoly on the state among the country’s majority Sunnis. 
 
 
The Main Economic Reforms 
 
The most striking change in Syria’s economy under Bashar al-Asad is the 
liberalization of the finance sector. For the first time since the 1963 Ba‘th takeover, 
the private sector made its appearance in services like banking, insurance and foreign 
exchange. In addition, the government has taken steps to reform Syria’s tax system, 
trade regime and investment law. 
 
The first private banks130 were opened in 2004 and within three years the number of 
private credit institutions had grown to 10.131 Insurance companies were cleared for 
private investors in 2005, and within three years 5 private insurance companies were 
operating. Interestingly, the liberalization of the finance sector also included Islamic 
Banks and insurance companies. Fuelled by Gulf capital, the first Islamic credit 
institutions132 entered the market in 2007.133 
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Regulation of foreign currency transactions has traditionally been very strict. 
Commercial Bank of Syria was for a long time the only institution authorized to issue 
US Dollars, which again could only be used for specific purposes. Since January 
2007, however, Syrian traders are allowed to purchase all their foreign exchange 
requirements from local banks to finance imports. The Central Bank simultaneously 
abolished the multiple exchange rate system and set a unified rate for the Syrian 
Pound. 
 
The opening of a capital market is expected in 2008. A Capital Market Authority was 
established in February 2006 and the legal framework for the Damascus Stock 
Exchange is in place. The actual opening and functioning of the market will however 
need to bridge the historical lack of trust between the private sector and the state in 
Syria. A stock exchange requires companies to go public, meaning they will have to 
provide financial statements for their last working years. But in the aim to evade taxes 
these same companies have consistently declared to be losing money year after year. 
The criteria of success in a stock market, i.e. proof that your company is profitable, is 
exactly the opposite of what it took to “get the state of your back” in socialist Syria. 
 
Syria has moreover simplified its trade policies by cutting tariffs, reducing the list of 
prohibited products, abolishing the exclusive rights of import agencies, and merging 
import monopolies. Maximum import tariffs are down from 255 percent to 60 percent 
and the list of banned items, which previously counted 24 pages, is now down to 
eight.134 Damascus enacted the Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA) in 2005 and 
two years later a free trade area with Turkey came into effect. Non-tariff barriers 
remain substantial however.135 
 
In a move to encourage private investment, the Syrian government also simplified the 
tax system and lowered the corporate tax rates. Until it was brought to 35 percent in 
2003, the top marginal corporate tax rate in Syria was 65 percent. Decree No. 51 of 
2006 furthered lowered the top tax rate to 28 percent on net profit exceeding 3 million 
Syrian Pounds. Private companies that offer at least 50 percent of the share capital for 
public subscription will only have to pay 14 percent corporate tax, and will be exempt 
from paying local taxes.136 
 
In October 2006, the Cabinet approved a new investment law, replacing the famous 
and once so groundbreaking Law 10 of 1991. It includes establishing an autonomous 
investment authority and transforms previous lengthy bureaucratic and administrative 
procedures into a “one-stop shop” for foreign as well as local investors. It also allows 
for free repatriation of all profits, not just profits generated from exports. 
 
 
Absent reforms 
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 In reference to the above-mentioned progress, officials and loyalist 
businessmen often express great satisfaction with the state of reform. According to an 
industrialist and member of Parliament Bahaeddin Hassan, for instance, Syria “in two 
years time will have a completely open economy without obstacles of any kind”.137 In 
reality however, different reform dossiers have progressed at a very uneven speed. 
Development in the following components of a standard market transition has 
especially been slow. 
 
The first is public sector reform. Despite what is widely seen as appalling 
productivity, the government has not touched the administrative sector to preserve the 
work of an estimated 1,4 million Syrians. Technocrats believe the inevitable solution 
is to lay off civil servants and spend the money saved on higher wages and incentives 
for those who remain, but that requires modification of the labour law and serious 
political will. So far, the signal from Finance minister Muhammad Husayn and deputy 
Prime minister for Economic Affairs Abdallah Dardari, is that the public sector is a 
“red line”. 
 
There has secondly been little progress in terms of subsidy reduction. According to 
Dardari, Syria is to allocate 7 billion US Dollars in its 2008 budget to subsidise 
energy, basic commodities and food supplies, a major increase from last year and 
more than 20 percent of the country’s GDP.138 Much of the state’s subsidies go to 
agriculture, aiming to keep down the price of “strategic foodstuff” like cotton, wheat 
and barley. They come in the form of cheap fuel and in direct payments to producers. 
The government also subsidises the price of electricity for industry and households. 
Fuel subsidies alone represent more than 10 percent of Syria’s GDP.139 
 
Last but not least, institutional reform required for “levelling the playing field” is 
lagging behind. For instance, Bashar al-Asad’s approach to market adjustment 
comprised no judiciary reform or anti-corruption law. The reform package similarly 
lacked a proper anti-monopoly legislation and tools for enforcement. Likewise, the 
2004-2008 streamlining of business laws and regulation had no legal framework for 
trust and dumping. The absence of such “fair play” institutions is likely to cause great 
harm to the Syrian economy. 
 
 
Friend with capital, friend with labour 
 
 On balance, the reforms carried out in 2004-2007 may be qualified as “easily 
scored points” in a political perspective. By liberalizing rules and regulations for the 
private sector and avoiding the fundamental issues in the public sector, they have 
generated goodwill in the business community without antagonizing the regime’s 
traditional constituency.140 Bashar al-Asad protected bureaucrats from employee 
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reduction, peasants and workers from subsidy cuts, and rent-seekers from 
transparency. At the same time, he effectively turned to the private sector. 
 
The ideological outline for reform reflects a similar ambiguity with the aim of 
pleasing all classes. For one, the idea of a “social market economy” was introduced at 
the 2005 Ba‘th Party Congress to signal departure from socialism without having to 
embrace the word capitalism. Preferring vagueness to counterbalance opposing 
ideological currents inside the state apparatus, the Ba‘th Party avoided to define its 
new development goal.141 Nor did it change the article 3 of the constitution, which 
defines Syria as a “socialist Arab state”. The proponents of the one or the other 
production system can thus alternatively refer to the constitution or the Ba‘th party to 
justify their views. Officially, Syria is indeed both socialist and becoming a social 
market economy. 
 
The 10th Five Year Development Plan is marked by a similar consensual approach to 
the remodelling of society. It calls for a “new social contract”, but never approaches 
this in class terms. Instead, the contract shall be forged among the “vital forces in 
society”, which it defines as the private sector, civil society organizations and the 
state. The omission of peasants and workers among society’s “vital forces” in the 
Syrian context is striking, though officials will retort that they inherently are part of 
the Ba’thist state. The fact remains that the working class is never really recognized as 
such in the 10th Five Year Plan, which rather adopts a modern technocrat vocabulary 
(using words like poverty control, social equity issues, impoverished regions etc.). 
Likewise, the private sector is described as a “co-investor” and “partner” without any 
reference to class terms.142 
 
While class is not an issue in the 10th Five Year Plan, mentality and culture are. In 
line with the plan’s focus on the challenge of globalization and calls for 
competitiveness and knowledge, a number of key-points in the fundamental “Future 
Vision: Syria 2025” introduces such considerations. Among the long-term 
recommendations for Syria listed in Chapter 3 we find “human and intellectual 
capital, characterized by efficiency, critical and creative mind”, (p.3), “a radical 
change in the prevailing attitudes and behaviours at the work and management of 
public sector establishments and central and local state machinery”, (p.5), “a modern 
institutional structure with new and modern institutional mentality and behaviour, as 
well as a culture aimed to promote quality, high productivity, saving and well-advised 
investment” (p.5), “a culture dedicated to free enterprise as part of the social and 
educational upbringing, aimed at creating a series of new values for the rising young 
entrepreneurs” (p.6) and “a new national character … enabling the Syrian citizen to 
                                                
141 In the absence of a definition of the concept, the new development goal has provoked some heavy 
criticism and debate. Bashar al-Asad had the following comment to this in his July 2007 address to the 
Syrian Parliament: “There have been a lot of talk and discussions about the term ‘social market’. Most 
of these discussions started from what we read in books. Of course, there are a lot of views and 
thoughts and academic debate. But for us as a state… we only bow for the interest of the people. 
Nobody can impose on us a term or any other thing we must abide by. We decide ourselves which term 
to use and what meaning to give it. Remember at the time of the Socialist block there was a huge 
difference between the Eastern and Western socialisms. Even inside the Eastern socialism there was 
sometimes divergence on the application of socialism. So when somebody comes to us and says ‘this is 
the dictionary and this term is different from what we’re doing’, we say to him ‘don’t mind us, this is 
what we want and this is our interest” (Sham Press, 18.07.2007).  
142 See the fundamental chapters 1 and 3 of the 10th Five Year Development Plan. 
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deal with the complex societal demands … to keep abreast with the spirit of modern 
age” (p.7).143 It’s the mentality, stupid! 
 
 
Part Two: the Private Sector 
 
Answering the call… 
 
 Bashar al-Asad’s vision for a new and modern Syria has sparked enthusiasm 
in the private sector. Confident that the new president will move the country their 
way, and reassured by his ability to stay in power, the business elite is hedging its bets 
on him and complying with his wishes. The presidential referendum in June 2007 
gave a particularly striking illustration of business’ support and compliance. Big 
capital and not the Ba‘th party formed the financial and logistical backbone of the 
president’s “Yes campaign”. In the weeks preceding the election, entrepreneurs 
organized praising street parties all over the capital. Proudly showing off their 
expenses for the festivities, businessmen distributed food and sweets and had music 
for young people dancing.144 Entrepreneurs also sponsored massive Bashar-
advertisement on billboards and street posters. The Syrian billboard market is 
controlled by a handful of investors with strong ties to the regime and the president. 
Willingly or out of fear of not appearing enthusiastic, other business actors found 
themselves in an overbid for advertising space to sign a picture of the president with 
their brand name. 
 
In the weeks following the referendum, it was rumoured that state representatives had 
put pressure on business groups by asking managers whether they intended to 
organize a street party or put up a banner. Irrespective of the veracity of these claims, 
the motives behind the businessmen’s actions are arguably less important than the fact 
that they actually did stage massive public support and made the president look 
“modern” and powerful. As Lisa Wadeen argues, the symbolic domination and show-
off effect of pro-regime rallies in Syria is more important than the personal conviction 
of the people behind it.145 Be that as it may, interviews with entrepreneurs in fact 
leave the impression that private sector’s enthusiasm with Bashar al-Asad may be 
genuine. For a first indication of this claim, consider the following evaluation of the 
Bashar era from a Damascene industrialist: 
 
Under Bashar a whole new picture emerged. The new president wanted to 
change the killing routine that we were living. The private sector was invited 
to participate in decision making as a national rather than private concern. 
Good new laws started supporting the private sector, and confidence between 
the state and the private sector increased. The transformation was 
methodological, gradual, organized and well studied. Today, the public and 
the private sectors are supporting each other. We always write, “made in 
Syria” on our products.146 
                                                
143 All page number from Chapter 3: Strategy, Objectives, and Goals.  
144 See Joshua Landis: ”The Presidential Plebiscite and Pageantry: What does it Mean?”, Syria 
Comment 4th June 2007, http://joshualandis.com/blog/?p=274 
145 See Lisa Wedeen: Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary 
Syria, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1999. 
146 Author’s interview June 2007 
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As a parallel to the inclusion of private entrepreneurs in Deng Xiaoping’s 
China147, the industrialist’s feeling of having become a national concern is very 
interesting. The unspoken backdrop for the argument is the negative view of private 
capital that was brought to Syria by Nasserism and the Ba‘thist revolution of the 1960s. 
Official diatribes against the “reactionary bourgeoisie” were frequent at the time.148 The 
private sector was alternatively presented as a “parasite” eating the fruits of society for its 
own personal greed, and a “traitor” in alliance with Western capital and the fallen 
nobility. Though popular scepticism to the rich and wealthy still exists, the regime’s turn 
to the private sector has politically deflated the anti-capitalist rhetoric. In fact, 
entrepreneurial values have been integrated in the official Ba‘thist ethos, allowing 
entrepreneurs like the one quoted above to identify themselves with the state. 
Demonstrating a self-conscious perception of his profession’s contribution, the 
industrialist in question actually suggested that engineers working in the private sector 
should be exempt from military service in recognition of their value for the nation! 
 
Private sector support for Bashar al-Asad’s modernization project is also seen in 
its contribution to the emergence of a loyal associative sector. Since 2000, several 
modern-oriented businessmen have invested their time, energy and money in the creation 
of NGOs and press publications. A case in point is ‘Abdulsalam Haykal, the son of 
Mohamed Haykal, an influential entrepreneur from Tartus who made his fortune in 
shipping. After studying at the American University in Beirut and later at the School of 
Oriental and African Studies in London, ‘Abdulsalam was part of a group of 11 founding 
members of the Syrian Young Entrepreneurs’ Association (SYEA). The SYEA primary 
aim is to promote entrepreneurship among youth in Syria. A stronger ambition posted on 
its website is to “create a new economic environment where young entrepreneurs 
contribute on the basis of science and modern management techniques”.149 One could 
hardly find a better replication of Bashar al-Asad’s call to modernize the Syrian economy 
and society. The SYEA was according to now-president Haykal the country’s first non-
charity NGO. From the very start it won the support of Asma al-Asad who provided 
authorisations and helped the association raise its first funds. The First Lady notably 
obtained a contribution to the SYEA from Saudi Prince Walid Bin Talal.150 
 
‘Abdulsalam Haykal also publishes, through his company Haykal media, the 
Arabic monthly al-Iqtisad wa-l Naql and its English-edited counterpart Forward 
Magazine. The former promotes itself as the “journal of the Syrian elite” while the latter 
primarily targets expatriates and international readers. The name “Forward” is meant to 
convey a fundamental optimism in Syria’s development and future. As its website reads: 
“Forward speaks hope. It speaks of good things in Syria. It preaches optimism. It 
highlights the talent, character, and potential of the Syrian people. It does not distort facts, 
however, nor does it falsify realities. Simply, it looks at the bright side of things, while 
pointing to the shortcomings, with the objective of change and reform, rather than 
                                                
147 For a discussion of the Chinese development see Deng Peng: “From Outcast to Honoured Guests: 
The Changing Fortune of Private Entrepreneurs in China and the Struggle for CCP Legitimacy”, 
Journal of Third World Studies, vol. 23, no. 1, 2006, p. 23-50. 
148 See Steven Heydemann: Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict 1946-1970, 
Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1999, p. 181-192. 
149 http://www.syea.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3&Itemid=5 
150 Author’s interviews with president and vice-president of the SYEA June 2007.  
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criticism”.151 This discourse echoes a theme developed by Bashar al-Asad since his 17th 
July 2000 address to the Syrian Parliament. In it, he distinguished between “constructive 
criticism” (which he condoned) and “destructive criticism” (which he condemned) and 
called the ability to see positive as well as negative aspects “the secret to any 
development”.152 Forward’s first issue bore the picture of a road sign with an arrow 
straight ahead as opposed to other signs commanding stop in the background. Below the 
arrow, the magazine had summarized its credo as follows: “BETTER LIFE AHEAD. NO 
STOPPING. NO GOING BACK”.153 
 
… But not settling for a social market economy 
 
“I don’t know what a social market economy means”, affirmed an influential member 
of the Aleppo Chamber of Commerce, “either it’s a free or it’s a regulated economy – 
there is nothing in between!”154 The comment reflects the two principal attitudes of 
Syrian businessmen toward the development goal declared by the Ba‘th Party 
Congress: confusion and impatience. On the one hand, entrepreneurs seem bewildered 
by a concept that they do not understand and the leadership has made little effort to 
elucidate. Thus a leading businessman who regularly states his opinions in the press 
confidently claimed that Syria’s solution was “neither socialism nor capitalism”, but 
became very hesitant when asked to describe the alternative: “Well, I think liberal… 
liberal economy… but nobody accepts this system”.155 On the other hand, most of the 
entrepreneurs interviewed for this report expressed their preference for a clear-cut 
market economy. A leading member of the Damascus Chamber of Commerce had the 
following comment: 
 
“The government keeps talking about a special system that does not exist 
anywhere. There are talking about a “social market economy” which is a 
concept that only exists in Syria. They want to improve and enlarge the private 
sector while simultaneously strengthening the public sector. But as long as 
they have this conception, we will not have real reform. You know, it’s like the 
son (the government sector) and the son-in-law (private sector). You may care 
for your son-in-law and want to help him, but at the end of the day, you will 
give priority to your own son”.156 
 
There is in other words still scepticism in the private sector of the “middle road” 
proposed at the Ba‘th Party Congress. While pleased with the departure from socialism, 
the entrepreneurs will only celebrate victory when a formal embrace of capitalism is 
made. 
 
 
Identifying the problem 
 
                                                
151 http://www.fw-magazine.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=93&Itemid=9 
152 See http://www.rtv.gov.sy/index.php?m=15&id=f1118750563 
153 Forward Magazine, Issue 1, January 2007. 
154 Author’s interview March 2007 
155 Author’s interview March 2007. The same entrepreneur later made an insightful comment on the 
difference between Syria and a socialist economy: “Socialism the way I see it is that everybody should 
have money. Syria is not like that”.  
156 Author’s interview June 2007 
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A 2005 World Bank report on the Syrian investment climate identifies three main 
obstacles to “unlocking the potential of the private sector” in the country. The first is 
limits of opportunity caused by public sector monopolies (in sectors like cement, sugar-
refining, fertilizers, oil refining, mineral water, electricity, and telecommunication), non-
tariff barriers, and barriers to entry and investment. The second is high and uncertain 
costs of doing business arising from taxes and tax administration, customs and trade 
facilitation, bureaucratic discretion and regulatory procedures and an outdated legal 
framework for contracts and property rights. Finally, the report stresses factor market 
weaknesses in labour markets, financial services, infrastructure (including electric power) 
and technological factors.157 
 
When private entrepreneurs describe the downsides of the Syrian economy, 
however, such factors are seldom in the picture. Rather, considerations of culture and 
mentality dominate the list of problems identified by the private sector. First and 
foremost, businessmen lament the skills and work ethic of bureaucrats in the state 
administration and their own company staff. Consider, to start with, the following 
assessment of state personnel by a Damascene industrialist: 
 
We were expecting faster economic reforms. But the main problem is with human 
resources. Most of the people working in the government did their studies in the Eastern 
block and are thinking in an old-fashioned manner. They were under average gifted 
students who got their certificates without real studies. The government at the time sent 
all the people from the Ba‘th party and student unions to study in Eastern Europe 
regardless of capabilities. This is why we have a lot of incapable people in our 
governments who are not able of driving reforms. In fact, they are actually against 
economic reforms because they will lose their privileges. They know perfectly well that 
when reforms are carried out, there will no longer be need for them.158 
 
The entrepreneur later explained that “Bashar al-Asad and his family” want 
reform, but is obstructed by the people around them. There is in other words a clash 
between the progressive, modern-oriented president and his East Block-educated 
bureaucrats who are “thinking in an old-fashioned manner”. These yesterday’s men are 
clinging to their privileges because they know they will be useless in the Syria of 
tomorrow. Entrepreneurs are also critical to the education in Syrian universities. A young 
western-educated business manager sighed the following when asked about the 
fundamental problems his company is facing: 
 
We recently refrained from applying on a project because we knew we would not have 
enough qualified employees to carry it through. If I were working in Europe I would probably 
hire a lot of newly post-graduate youngsters and work with them. But here, “interns” from the 
universities cannot be used to anything before two years. They’re more of a burden than they will 
help you.159 
 
Even more than qualifications, it is the attitude of the Syrian workers which the 
most upsets the private sector. One of the most recurring arguments in interviews with the 
                                                
157 See The World Bank: Syrian Investment Climate Assessment: Unlocking the Potential of the Private 
Sector, June 8 2005 See http://web.worldbank.org 
158 Author’s interview June 2007 
159 Author’s interview June 2007 
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industrialists is the idea that mentality, and not reality, accounts for poverty and 
unemployment in Syria. As explained by a Damascene industrialist: 
 
- How do you think that Syria can solve its poverty problem? 
- There is no poverty in Syria, and no unemployment. I always lack 50-60 workers 
in my factory. This tells me that there is only self-imposed unemployment. People 
are lazy and don’t want to work. Open the newspaper and see how many 
companies are looking for employees. There is always a job for you.160 
 
An investor from Aleppo presents a similar argument to explain (and justify) the 
country’s growing social differences: 
 
- Some say that economic reforms are increasing inequalities between rich and 
poor in Syria… 
- The inequalities you see are simply the differences between those who work and 
those who don’t. If somebody is rich it is because he has been working hard. 
Many workers in Syria only work a couple of hours a day (…) There is no real 
unemployment in Syria. If someone wants to work there is always something to 
do. The problem is related to our education. They are not taught that you need to 
work. In the final analysis the problem returns to the state.161 
 
Even a businessman member of the highly conformist Syrian parliament explains 
that the problem is mentality: 
 
- Some say that economic liberalization is increasing poverty by making 
living conditions difficult for the dispossessed… 
- I don’t believe in this. On the contrary, closure increases poverty. In 
today’s globalized economy, there is no escape from economic reform. We 
have to make the Syrian economy competitive in the world market. We 
have to work on the mentalities. Today, the people are used to laziness. 
Their only ambition in life is to get a position in a public office. But there 
are no longer any posts in the public sector. People have to learn to 
depend on themselves, to create work for themselves, rather than expect to 
get everything from the state. Let me give an example: In this country of 
poverty and unemployment, if I decide to open a factory and need to hire 
200 workers I might not find them. They will understand that this is a job 
where they will actually have to work and prefer to stay in a public office. 
The negative result for Syria is that we have growing differences between 
the rich and poor in our country.162 
 
Absent from these considerations are the structural reasons behind falling labour 
productivity in Syria. The entrepreneurs never mention that wages for blue and white-
collar workers are low163, that low and middle-ranking bureaucrats and workers often 
have a second job to make a living, that health services and insurance are better in the 
state than in the private sector, or the various barriers of entry (financial, political etc.) 
                                                
160 Author’s interview June 2007 
161 Author’s interview March 2007 
162 Author’s interview June 2007 
163 According to a 2005 survey by the Syrian Bureau of Statistics, 64 percent of Syrian workers earned 
less than 8000 Syrian Pounds, 16 percent between 8000-9999 SP and another 14 between 10 000-
14 999 SP (SBS: dirasat al-talab ‘ala al-quwwa al-‘amila fi-l jumhuriya al-‘arabiya al-suria, 2005) 
 47 
that prevent the Syrian working class from starting their own businesses. Quite on the 
contrary, in the businessman-parliamentarian’s assessment, the workers’ “unwillingness 
to work” becomes the very reason for social inequalities. And the clue to create a 
competitive Syrian economy is accordingly to “work on the mentalities”. 
 
 
Representing the solution 
 
As much as the problems identified above are personal (as opposed to structural) 
and culture-oriented, the “entrepreneurial way of thinking” appears like the solution and 
ideal. And the more the state-led development model seems to be failing, the stronger 
gets businessmen’s confidence that they represent the cure for Syria’s ills. A young and 
ambitious entrepreneur gave an eloquent formulation of this widespread conception: “We 
should tell young people to be job creators, not job seekers”, he explained, “to avoid them 
knocking on the already overloaded public sector’s door”.164 “Syrians must learn to take 
personal responsibility”, the entrepreneur went on, underlining his point with an example 
from his own business group: 
 
My dream is for this office to turn into a modern organization, where I can be the 
business owner without carrying all the responsibility; an organization that would no longer be a 
‘one man show’ where all matters – big or small – end up in my office, an organization where I 
could answer on the phone that ‘this is not my field – you will have to talk to the sector manager’. 
In such an organization, I could take a take a holiday, write a PhD or found other companies 
without affecting the affairs of the current one. But this does not exist in Syria. It needs a cultural 
change. The present system is a legacy of our family business culture where, for any decision or 
authorization, you have to talk to ‘daddy’.165 
 
Traditionally, because of a lack of trust and a well-defined legal framework, the 
huge majority of private enterprises in Syria have been run as family businesses. Several 
entrepreneurs explain that they only share investments with their very closest associated 
to avoid being deceived and then incapable to reclaim their right if their adversary has 
stronger personal contacts and manipulates the judiciary. The family-oriented model has 
its own problems however, as another young entrepreneur explained: “family enterprises 
make us vulnerable to quarrels, misuse by personal interest and falling standards when 
the company is passed on to the next generation”.166 Moreover, as family businesses are 
used to keep information for themselves and allow minimal public insight, they will find 
it hard to enter the soon-to-be-opened Syrian stock exchange. It is against this 
background that one should understand the above-formulated dream of a “modern 
organization” and perception to be leading a “cultural change”. The business manager 
explained how he is training company staff to become “intrapreneurs” in the sense of 
innovating and seizing opportunities inside the company. This discourse is also an 
interesting echo of the modernization-call of Bashar al-Asad. Indeed, for the young and 
energetic manager in question, entrepreneur-style personal responsibility is precisely 
what is needed for the Syrian public sector: 
 
- What are the key elements missing in Syria’s reform achievements? 
- Number one is administrative reform. If you have a correct administration 
everyone can work in Syria. We need bureaucrats that are willing to take 
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responsibility. The present employees in the public sector are either careless or 
afraid. It is easy to understand why – they would risk prison for making the 
wrong decisions. But we need entrepreneurs, people who are not afraid, in the 
public sector as well. The government has to start major training of bureaucrats 
to strengthen responsibility. 
 
In a convincing discourse like this, entrepreneurship breaks loose from the narrow 
associations of personal enrichment and becomes the quality required for reforming the 
country and the state. It marks the “comeback” of the private sector in face of the once so 
unattainable bureaucracy and symbolically puts entrepreneurs on top of the development. 
They have the courage, technical capacity and modern ideas. Not all entrepreneurs are as 
compassionate and creative as the above-presented this young entrepreneur however. On 
the subject of bureaucratic inefficiency and workers who are left out by Syria’s 
adjustment to globalisation, a wealthy Damascene businessman suggested a far more 
radical solution: 
 
- Syria needs to go through a “surgical operation”. It is like when there is a 
sickness in your body and you need to take it out. Unfortunately, a lot of people 
who have made a lot of efforts are no longer useful. It is very unfortunate that 
they have to suffer, but it’s like that. 
- Is there no way to alleviate the problems for those who will suffer from reform? 
- Not that I know of.167 
 
This total embrace of social Darwinism deepens our understanding of the earlier 
presented entrepreneurs’ view that there is nothing between socialism and a free-market 
economy. In a follow-up comment the businessman précised that “the public sector can 
go to hell”. The interesting point is of course that we are facing an entrepreneur who built 
his company within the framework of the Ba’thist system, benefited from the state-
enforced absence of competition, knew how to manoeuvre in its politicised environment 
etc., but now calls for a total break with the past. He has nothing but contempt for the 
protectionist bureaucracy he has made his fortune knowing how to manipulate, and 
cynically compares the remnants of the socialist system with a disease. When a 
businessman who thrived under Ba’thist protection calls for a “surgical operation” to give 
room for the private sector, you can tell that Syria has changed. Still, though the 
entrepreneurs in this respect have lost their fear, their outspokenness and courage do not 
extend to the political scene. 
 
 
Carefully dealing with politics 
 
 Businessmen in Syria have clear political visibility. While private 
entrepreneurs stayed aloof from politics in a country like Iran, which has undergone a 
similar adjustment to market economy since 1990, the Damascene bourgeoisie’s 
political agency is both recognized and practiced.168 As part of Hafiz al-Asad’s first 
economic infitah in the 1970s, business was allowed to stage some “independent” 
candidates for parliamentary elections. The scale of this practice increased with the 
second infitah, and since 1990, business has always had a considerable presence in the 
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168 For a discussion of the Iranian bourgeoisie’s position see Kjetil Selvik: “The Rise and Newfound 
Legitimacy of Iran’s Industrial Bourgeoisie”, University of Oslo Gulf Studies, no. 2, 2005 
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Syrian popular assembly. In the 2007 parliamentary election, all major “independent 
lists” in Damascus consisted of businessmen in association with religious sheikhs. 
Thus, from the winning Fayha list industrialist Adnan Dakhakheni, merchant 
Bahaeddin Hasan, businessman Samir al-Dibs, lawyer Ghalib ‘Unaiz and 
engineer/regime crony Muhammad Hamshu were sent to Parliament with the spiritual 
guidance of Sheikh Abd al-Salam Rajih from the Kaftaru religious academy.169 From 
the rival Sham list, the high-profile businessmen Hashim ‘Aqqad and Zahir Da‘bul 
made their way to the People’s Assembly. 
 
According to parliamentarian and sheikh Mohammad al-Habash, who aligned 
himself with the Sham list, only some 10 per cent of independent candidates are not 
businessmen. Though the estimate is clearly on the high side (especially if one looks 
beyond Damascus) business’ financial muscle is an undeniable source of success in the 
electoral campaigns. For Habash, the lack of interest and awareness of the Syrian 
electorate strongly favour private capital interests. He explained: “only Damascus has 
1000 electoral boxes. In order to get people to vote for you at each voting station, you 
therefore need 1000 representatives (sing. wakil) around the city. The wakil sits by the 
box throughout the election, shows pictures of you and encourages people to vote. Each 
wakil will cost you about 100 US Dollars for two days, so if you add up with 1000 boxes 
you’ll be paying 100 000 US Dollars. And some candidates send 10 representatives to 
each electoral box”.170 
 
The predominance of businessmen among Damascene independent candidates 
does not make them a strong political factor. For one, the Syrian Parliament has very 
limited decision-making power. Most laws are introduced by presidential decree with the 
Parliament reduced to a rubberstamp function. Secondly, while “independents” control 
one-third of the seats in Parliament, the National Progressive Front of the Ba‘th party and 
its allies have preserved a two-third majority. Last but not least, businessmen lack a clear 
political agenda and even fail to act as a block. The electoral lists are mere convenience-
based strategic alliances without as much as a formal program, whose candidates – when 
elected – act as individuals in the People’s Assembly. In conversation with the author, a 
leading Fayha businessman gave the following explanation for this state of affairs: 
 
- [to the author]: It seems you followed our elections closely? 
- I was in Syria at the time. 
- So what did you think of our poster? 
- It was nice, but the only problem was that there was so little information about 
the candidates. One could not really differentiate between the ideas of a person 
on this list versus the other. 
- You’re right, but in Syria you must remember two things. Firstly, it is a small 
country, where people know a lot about you just by hearing your name. The 
voters may not know me personally, but they know I’m a successful businessman 
for instance, belonging to a liberal rather than socialist trend. Secondly, given 
the majority of the National Front in the Parliament, having a program would 
not be very fare.  As independents, we will in anyways belong to a minority and 
have to align ourselves with the majority. Independent candidates would be 
                                                
169 When interrogated on the rationale behind the composition of the list, Samir al-Dibs explained that 
Fayha wanted “all professions of society to be represented: industrialist, merchant, engineer, sheikh. If 
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hypocrites if they were to pretend that they had a program they could realize in 
Parliament. Not even 1 percent of your political ideas will be taken into 
consideration, so you have to be realistic about your role. 
- Then what is your role in Parliament? 
- Supervising members of the government. That is the whole reason why I’m there. 
I’m especially following economic issues. Politics are sensitive in this country so 
I prefer to concentrate on economic affairs.171 
 
Beyond the estimate that “less then 1 percent of independent parliamentarians’ 
ideas will be taken into consideration”, and that it therefore is futile to pretend to have a 
program, the entrepreneur’s last comment gives an additional hint as to why businessmen 
have not taken over the political life in Syria. With money invested in a range of business 
projects, they simply have too much to lose. Politics is a risky exercise in Syria, and as an 
industrialist explicitly stated, “capital is always afraid”.172 A successful investor like the 
one quoted above therefore prefers to concentrate on economics in Parliament, which he 
considers a safe bet. Other parliamentarians adapt by taking on a strict consensual 
language when commenting on political affairs. Asked to situate the preference of his 
electoral list in the heated debate on Syria’s new economic system, another deputy from 
the Fayha list gave the following answer: 
 
Syria is going through a period of economic growth and openings for investments. 
The goal has to be to raise the income of the citizen and fulfil his needs. We all support 
the idea of a social market economy. We must take care of the partnership with peasants 
and workers that we cherish, and not hurt the public sector. The Syrian way is agreement 
of opinion. We have to avoid divisions. In our Parliament we have no lobbies, but 
harmony and cooperation.173 
 
The reflections on the need to “take care of the partnership with peasants and 
workers and not hurt the public sector” are quite different from the neo-liberal views 
related above that the entrepreneurs expressed in private. Speaking as a member of 
parliament to a foreign researcher on a contentious issue makes the deputy sound very 
conformist. He is not prepared to admit that conflicting class interests affect the 
Parliament or Syria. Instead, he chooses to praise internal unity, echoing the corporatist 
vision of society the Ba’thist regime has promoted for decades. By failing to state their 
views under conditions of political pressure, however, the entrepreneurs lose every 
possibility to influence the public debate. For comparison, consider the straightforward 
attack on businessmen in Parliament by the outspoken and renowned Muhammad al-
Habash: 
 
“The result [of businessmen’s dominance among independent candidates] is 
terrible. For instance, the number one candidate in Damascus, Hamshu, is a 
completely incompetent politician. During the last parliamentary round, I had 
not heard him raise his voice a single time. Still, due to the money side of the 
elections, he got the greatest vote number. Businessmen do not play a positive 
role in the Parliament. 90 percent are there for publicity only. They attend the 
first 20-30 minutes of the day’s session when there is filming. If there is a 
                                                
171 Author’s interview June 2007 
172 In Arabic: “ra’s al-mal jaban”, Author’s interview June 2007 
173 Author’s interview June 2007 
 51 
special occasion they might stay a little longer. But they do not contribute 
anything to the creation of laws and the political debate”.174 
 
If their political interest and experience is as weak as Habash suggests, the 
question becomes why businessmen care to stand for parliamentary elections at all. The 
answer seems to lie in a combination of prestige and political contacts. Though the 
Parliament has very limited decision-making influence, there is undoubtedly an aura of 
respect to the status of parliamentarian that enhances entrepreneurs’ social capital. This 
again opens business opportunities as you’re invited to feasts and occasions and get to 
mingle with ‘people in high places’. Following a typical pattern of military-mercantile 
capitalism, crony capitalists have a tradition of informal business deals with military and 
intelligence officers, gaining privileged access to market positions, monopolies and state 
contracts. As a consequence, businessmen are reported having invested up to 3 million 
US Dollars for the electoral campaign to bring them into Parliament. Asked for an 
explanation for this heavy spending given the tiny dividend in terms of decision-making 
influence, a businessman who himself denied having any political ambition gave the 
following explanation: 
 
It is because they fancy it. Look at it this way: I’m going to buy the top model of an Audi 
car. I love expensive cars. It is my vice. Some people like to go to the parliament for the prestige it 
gives them and maybe also some business opportunities. It is their vice.175 
 
It should be noted that few of the really big Syrian entrepreneurs are members of 
Parliament. Presumably, the most influential actors already have the prestige and 
connections it takes to do business in Syria. One of the most successful industrialists 
interviewed for this report, often included in the business ventures of the President’s 
cousin Rami Makhluf, gave the following description of his social and political status: 
 
I’m in a very special position. I am very near the people and at the same time have very, 
very good relations with the government. My influence in both camps is due to respect. There are 
not many people like me have strong connections and at the same time enjoy the trust of the 
population. There are not many people like me who are familiar with the two realities of society – 
down to the small shopkeeper – and the state. Because I’m trusted and respected, people come to 
me with their problems. The phone call I just received was from a friend who went to prison and 
needed my help to get out. I often help people who go to prison, not because they are criminals of 
course, but for economic problems and those kinds of things. Afterwards they’re all very grateful, 
and now this guy wanted to give a party to thank me. Next week we’re celebrating that I managed 
to bring together two families who for a long time were in war with each other.176 
 
Privileged entrepreneurs like the one in question here gain leverage through personal 
access to decision-makers. More specifically, a history of friendship or interaction 
with the President and/or his closest family can allow a businessman to circumvent 
the otherwise constraining features of the Ba‘th apparatus. The manager of a rapidly 
growing enterprise for instance explained that knows the Asad family from his 
childhood and used to play with Bashar as a child. Still today he sometimes spends 
his holidays with the President and family. Though the friendship according to the 
businessman is strictly personal and unrelated to politics, it nevertheless constitutes a 
useful political capital in times of trouble. The company manager for instance recalls 
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how he was allowed to build a factory outside the ordinary industrial zone of 
Damascus thanks to the personal intervention of Hafiz al-Asad.177 Such entrepreneurs 
can potentially exercise considerable political influence, though in capacity as 
individuals and not as a social group. In the assessment of several well-informed 
sources interviewed for this report, key “insider” businessmen are among the very 
most powerful in Syria, dominated by the heads of the military and intelligence 
services, but frequently more influential than government and Ba‘th party leaders.178 
No wonder “people come [to them] with their problems” as the above-quoted 
industrialist put it. Indeed, the newfound weight within the system, combined with 
their non-state background, make them perfect “go-betweens” and fixers. This way, 
the entrepreneurs are both accumulating social capital and helping to “lubricate the 
system”. 
 
While some particularly influential businessmen are dealing with politics on a 
personal basis, most actors in the private sector prefer not to be dealing with it at all. 
This reflex to avoid playing with fire – shaped by decades of authoritarianism – is still 
the most common political attitude among Syrian entrepreneurs. The following 
reflection on the subject by a damascene industrialist is a typical illustration: 
 
I don’t care too much about politics. It is not my business. I am the president of this 
company and trying to make it work ideally. If everyone fulfilled his role in society, we would not 
have any problems. In the future I would like to contribute to the development of the nation by 
founding an educational institution. As my work is in engineering, I would like it to be a technical 
university. The most important would be to teach the students discipline; to come on time, keep 
their appointments and do what they have promised. When this is in order, the rest comes 
naturally. (…) Syria is a very safe country. As long as you stick to the rules and don’t enter areas 
of concern for the security services, nothing will happen to you. Even girls can walk alone in the 
streets at night. 
 
The entrepreneur’s disinterest in politics does not equal indifference to social and 
political organization in Syria. What comes out of a comment like this on the contrary 
a very strong case for stability, security and the status quo. The self-declared political 
sidelining rests on a corporatist vision of society where everyone does his duty and 
sticks to what he knows the most. For the entrepreneur as industrialist this means 
“building the country” through production or passing on his experience and 
knowledge as suggested here. Interestingly, in the projected technical university, “the 
most important would be to teach the students discipline”. Seen in the light of the 
later admonition to “stick to the rules” and not provoke the security services, the 
entrepreneur’s ambition is clearly compatible with Syria’s authoritarianism. In this 
context, silence certainly means approval of the political system in place. Seen from 
the regime’s perspective, gaining the support of entrepreneurs who put their energy 
and creativity behind Bashar al-Asad’s project is an important achievement. 
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Part Three: Towards a New Equilibrium? 
 
 
The guarantor of relative privilege 
 
 Since the beginning of its ‘corrective movement’ in 1970, the Asad dynasty 
has led Syria through a gradual accommodation with the private sector. Under Bashar 
al-Asad, the fruits of this reconciliation are fully starting to show. By reaching out to 
investors and private entrepreneurs the pressured Syrian leadership has rallied a new 
dynamic force behind the system as businessmen bring fresh resources of 
organization, communication and patronage and substitute a modern face of the 
Ba’thist system for its traditional austere socialist image. Most importantly, they 
represent a group outside the traditional Ba‘thist system that wholeheartedly gives it 
support to the President. In this they serve to reinvigorate a regime whose class-base 
and ideology long seemed to have frozen. 
 
The regime simultaneously seeks to maintain its traditional clientele by avoiding 
painful economic reforms. It has developed a dual response to the challenge of market 
forces that makes it the “guarantor of relative privilege” for both winners and losers in 
the process. For crony capitalists and (to a lesser extent) small and medium 
enterprises, economic liberalization represents an opportunity, while for workers, 
peasants and civil servants, it has become a source of fear. The regime skilfully 
exploits this situation by opening up for the private sector while at the same time 
protecting its clients from a potentially harsher economic reality. Thus, while business 
may praise the regime for things getting better, peasants, blue and white-collar 
workers may thank it for not getting worse.179 The result is a convergence of class 
interests towards the upholding of a political order that several groups might ideally 
like to replace. 
 
In the meantime the state has backed down from its original mission and adopted a 
“class-neutral” posture. It is friend with capital and friend with labour and carefully 
avoids the vocabulary of class antagonism. Syria is moving towards the “liberalized 
autocracy”-model that has become the norm in the Arab World.180 Rather than 
pinning its legitimacy to a single state ideology and commanding total obedience, 
such regimes allow the emergence of competing ideological trends in society and rule 
by counterbalancing rival groups. It is a game the Ba‘thist regime has learned to play 
by pitting secularists against Islamists in Syria. By choosing the ‘golden mean’ of a 
social market economy, Bashar al-Asad hopes to gain a similar role as mediator 
between proponents and opponents of capitalism. 
 
Differences nonetheless occur in the recognition of the groups’ political agency: 
Whereas the bourgeoisie is allowed to organize outside the corporatist framework, 
                                                
179 This argument of course is only valid for workers in the formal sector or others who implicitly 
benefit from state subsidies. The primary beneficiaries of the current state of affairs are farmers 
working with (the heavily subsidized) “strategic crops” like cotton, wheat and barley; workers in state-
owned enterprises; and civil servants.   
180 See Daniel Brumberg: “Liberalization versus Democracy: Understanding Arab Political Reform”, i 
Democracy and Rule of Law Paper, nr. 37, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Washington, 
D.C., 2003. 
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and express their views through private media outlets, the peasants and workers 
continue to be forcefully represented by the state. As Syrian economist Samir Seifan 
perspicuously argues: “In the populist social contract, the state told these groups that 
they did not have to express their viewpoints because the state would express them in 
their place. The state’s withdrawal from the role as the working class’ representative 
should imply that workers and peasants would be allowed to stage parties, unions or 
demonstrations, but none of this is accepted”.181 In fact, as we have seen, the working 
class is wholly left out of the discussions on Syria’s new social contract among the 
‘vital forces’ identified in the 10th Five Year Plan. 
 
The entrepreneurs’ interviewed for this report blame workers’ attitude for their country’s 
economic problem. They are in line with the recommendations of the 10th Five Year Plan 
which stresses the need for a mindset change. The dominating discourse does not relate 
culture to politics, however. Syria’s economic reform is dissociated conceptually from 
considerations of regime and class. Yet, as this paper has argued, there is indeed a 
political logic behind the present shape of reform: it aims to preserve a political system 
which at the end of the day has a far greater impact on Syrian mentalities than socialism 
itself. One can in other words not blindly put one’s hope in the “spirit of capitalism” to 
save the country’s economic and political future. The search for a new social contract 
started in the 10th Five Year Plan should rather be extended to political issues. 
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